Pathway to Japanese Literature

Letter of Inquiry Regarding the Failure to Cease Mining Operations Harmful to Public Interest

(February 26, Meiji 30 [1897], Submitted to the House of Representatives)

First: The cruel reality of toxic pollution from the Ashio Copper Mine in Kamitsuga District, Tochigi Prefecture, stood irrefutably clear—as evidenced both by the ongoing petitions for cessation of mining operations submitted by afflicted citizens across four prefectures (Tochigi, Gunma, Ibaraki, and Saitama), and by Gunma Prefectural Assembly’s formal resolution urging the Minister of Home Affairs to terminate said operations.
This constituted a major national issue that could not be neglected even for a single day.
Yet what reason had the government had for neglecting this for so many years?

First: On December 18, Meiji 24 [1891], we members formally questioned the Cabinet Ministers regarding the negligence of duties by responsible authorities in connection with the Ashio Copper Mine pollution damages.
Unfortunately, with the dissolution of the Second Diet, we were forced to read their written response in newspapers.
They stated that there had still been no definitive conclusion based on reliable test results regarding the cause of the damage.
They stated that preparations had been made to newly install ore powder collectors and further prevent the loss of mineral particles.
Yet how did the government explain the fact that mining operations had since grown increasingly severe, and the affected areas had continued to expand ever further?

First: On May 23, Meiji 25 [1892], we members conducted a second round of questioning against these contradictory responses, using test results from the Agricultural College to press Cabinet Ministers for clear answers.
Yet in their response—while admitting through test results that mining causes harm—they asserted the damage did not warrant halting operations; and though declaring the mining operator was preparing to install ore powder collectors to prevent future harm to plant growth, how do you justify continuing to ignore how six years after installing these so-called collectors, mining-related damages have only intensified?

First: On June 13 of the same year, we members conducted a third round of questioning in response to the aforementioned reply.
Yet during this third round of questioning, we exposed how the government had local officials arbitrate for mining operators; how these officials used the mere installation of ore powder collectors to deceive affected citizens; how they intercepted petitions to forcibly conceal facts—all conduct unbefitting constitutional governance. What justification does the central government have for providing no substantive response?

First: Following the dissolution of the Fifth Diet in December Meiji 26 [1893], the Sixth Diet of Meiji 27 [1894] was likewise dissolved, vainly depriving us of any opportunity for questioning.
At that time, coinciding with the Sino-Japanese War, we members—out of necessity for national unity—reluctantly suspended our government inquiries and endeavored to foster cooperation between officials and citizens.
However, when the 1894 flood caused mining pollution outflow to increase catastrophically, not only did mining operators descend into panic—local officials too, fearing their previous efforts would prove futile, exploited the absence of conscripted men to descend daily upon affected villages. There they intimidated elderly residents and children into stamping illiterate seals on arbitrarily drafted contracts, scheming thus for mining operators' benefit.
And yet what reason compels the government to turn a blind eye to this?

First: Regarding these matters, we members waited until the conclusion of the First Sino-Japanese War, then at the Meiji 29 [1896] Diet session exposed local officials' malicious schemes and conducted a fourth round of questioning.
Yet what reason did your government have for not only failing to provide proper responses but persisting unamended in these actions even now?

First: As detailed previously, mining pollution—increasing yearly since Meiji 27 [1894] floods—now extended beyond Watarase River, having crept northward to Tone River's banks. Tens of thousands of hectares across four prefectures' ten districts stood poised to become complete deserts.
Yet what justification existed for your government's continued inaction?

First: As the Ashio Copper Mine’s operations expanded, reckless deforestation at the headwaters of the Watarase River grew ever more rampant, completely severing all means of water source conservation. Consequently, soil erosion and riverbed siltation naturally deprived the waterway of boat navigation convenience, while flood inundations multiplied several times over compared to a decade ago.
And yet what reason does the government have for turning a blind eye to this?

First: How does the government intend to address citizens who, their lands and buildings encroached upon by mining operations, have lost hereditary property and face daily destitution?

First: Given the current conditions outlined above, coastal affected citizens lack sufficient food and clothing and fail to cultivate propriety.

By what means does the government intend to ensure citizens fulfill their obligations?

First: We members had repeatedly warned the government for many years, before the mining pollution's encroachment reached such profound severity in violating the public interest of an immense number of people.
Yet the authorities employed various pretexts to temporarily deceive [the public], and through procrastination and evasion have brought matters to this day, allowing the devastation to reach a point almost beyond remedy.
How does the government intend to restore the lives, property, and rights of affected citizens?

First: Despite Article 19, Paragraph 1 of the Mining Ordinance clearly stipulating that when prospecting or mining operations harm public interest, the director of the relevant mining supervision office may revoke prospecting permits, and the Minister of Agriculture and Commerce may revoke mining permits already granted—the government failed to cease these mining operations causing grave public harm. What reason explains why over 100,000 citizens in affected areas alone remained unable to receive the Meiji Constitution’s protection?

In accordance with Article 48 of the Diet Law, I pose this inquiry: The Cabinet Ministers are expected to provide a clear response bearing constitutional responsibility under Article 55 of the Meiji Constitution.

Diet Member Tanaka's Inquiry Address

(February 26, Meiji 30 [1897], at the House of Representatives)

I intend to state the reasons for this inquiry regarding the failure to cease mining operations harmful to public interest.
While there are many critical matters before us today, and I recognize my lengthy inquiry must be quite burdensome to you all, this questioning concerns an urgent issue in the provinces: district officials among these local authorities are currently engaged in oppressing and deceiving citizens through malicious acts. We must bring this to light as swiftly as possible to relieve their suffering, after which I shall formally notify the government of this inquiry’s key points and demand their response.
"Please grant me a brief moment of your attention."

This inquiry concerns the Ashio Copper Mine in Tochigi Prefecture, where mining pollution has caused such severe harm that petitions have been repeatedly submitted to the Minister of Agriculture and Commerce over the years—indeed, last year even the Gunma Prefectural Assembly went so far as to formally recommend to the Minister of Home Affairs that these mining operations be halted.
Furthermore, the people along the Watarase River—whether in new villages or new towns—now number fifty individuals who have obtained endorsements from village heads, with petitions still being continuously submitted.
The area affected by mining pollution spans four prefectures—Gunma, Tochigi, Saitama, and Ibaraki—encompassing twelve districts in total, though various investigative reports have only been partially compiled for eight districts thus far.
Fundamentally, these people reside in locations that are highly inaccessible for conducting investigations.
As this investigation spans twenty to thirty ri [approximately 78 to 117 kilometers], the work involved in conducting inquiries at county offices and prefectural offices across this range was immensely arduous.
For impoverished residents to investigate this proved difficult; as we have finally managed to partially compile investigations spanning eight districts, I shall now present these findings.

“This inquiry merely states: ‘Since this mining industry is harmful to public interest, it must be ceased.’”
“Whether mining operations are privately owned or state-owned, if the harm proves excessive, you must address them on those grounds.”
“Any enterprise—be it nominally private or national—must be unhesitatingly terminated when its harm outweighs benefits. We members first raised this matter in Meiji 24 [1891], submitting four formal inquiries and repeated advisories since.”
“This fifth appeal finds the Minister of Agriculture and Commerce occasionally responding, yet every reply consists of falsehoods. He claims no responsibility for these answers—no, worse than irresponsibility! These are fraudulent responses that have allowed mining pollution’s devastation to grow catastrophic.”
“Through this crisis, Parliament has lost faith in the government—the people now resent their rulers.”
“Thus our nation’s worth diminishes; we grow incapable of making foreigners respect Japan’s laws.”
“Not incapable—you provide no legal protections! When citizens receive no protection, they bear no obligation to uphold laws! And citizens without such obligations—who knows what desperate acts they might commit?”
“Faced with this precipice, I must urgently lay these matters before you all without delay.”

To clarify the sequence of inquiries, there were eighteen items dating from Meiji 24 onward—while mining pollution relates to political matters, I must now address the pollution itself in detail.
This explanation divides into dozens of items; first I shall summarize them collectively:
The reality of industrial promotion being conducted with prejudicial favoritism.
The actual extent to which mining pollution's damage has proliferated.
The connection between mining pollution and mountain forests—specifically the hazardous conditions created by indiscriminate logging of ancient trees in remote wilderness.
The relationship between mining pollution and flooding—how sediment discharged from denuded mountains has destroyed waterway navigability.
The imperative to exempt taxes levied on yields contaminated by mining pollution.

The expense categories arising from mining pollution damage.
The fact that mining pollution endangers human lives.
The fact that mining pollution flows into homes and contaminates other wells.
The fact that mining pollution deprives innocent citizens of their rights.
The fact that mining operators are running rampant.
The fact that the rampant actions of mining operators disrupt all of society and hinder the development of other industries.
The fact that despite this devastating situation, the affected citizens have been unable to raise their voices for many long years.
The fact that this mining industry has disrupted even politics; the so-called foundation of politics being the authorities—namely, the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce; the fact that this very Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce has been nearly thrown into disarray due to mining pollution.
These are the key points I shall now present to you.

“I shall begin by addressing the matter of biased industrial promotion. There exist those who launch enterprises and petition the government. When granting permits, one must duly investigate geographical conditions or evaluate human intellectual capacity—this stands as self-evident. Were one to permit an ammunition factory’s construction in central Tokyo without explosion prevention measures or chimney provisions for machinery installation—how would you account for such approval? To have authorized mining without surveying Kanto’s geography or Ashio’s terrain constitutes an incomprehensible act. Not only was permitting extraction at Ashio Copper Mine without geographical assessment erroneous; moreover, they installed machinery—without scrutinizing its operational functions, projected mining scale, or implementing proportional oversight—thereby wantonly sanctioning Kanto’s devastation.”

“Fundamentally, Kanto’s topography lies flat—level terrain where poison flows spread like water across floorboards.”

“To permit ventures in those mountains absent such investigations proves fundamentally misguided.”

“Should we inquire whether this stemmed from malice? It arose through negligence and academic deficiency—for even existing scholars’ unused expertise equates to ignorance itself. Thus we conclude the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce harbors no true scholars.”

“Moreover, to have permitted the reckless deforestation of 10,000 chō in primordial mountains untouched since antiquity, allowing water sources to dry up—this stems not from ignorance but malice.”
“You fully comprehend what calamities arise from deforestation.”
“This constitutes not negligence but malice.”
“Yet without ever scrutinizing the actual operations of Ashio Copper Mine—while touting its annual revenue exceeding two million yen as vital to national coffers, proclaiming it the Orient’s premier mine—this industry deforests mountains on one hand, poisons over 33,000 chō of farmland on the other, and forces 100,000 people to consume tainted water and food. All while remaining blind to the truth that the nation’s genuine wealth resides in its people.”
“You squander this nation’s resources while refusing to interrogate what evils this mining perpetrates—parroting only that mines constitute national assets.”
“Such arguments transcend ordinary reasoning—no official possessing sound intellect would voice such absurdities.”
“There exist underlying circumstances.”
“I need not elaborate—you doubtless apprehend them.”
“Given this reality, the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce’s conduct—whether born of ignorance, incompetence, or malfeasance—truly beggars description.”
“How many years has Hokkaido’s reclamation required to yield its meager farmland?”
“Since Meiji 4 [1871], barely 90,000 chō have been reclaimed—falling short even of that figure.”
“Within this, some 70,000 chō nominally bear taxes—though ‘taxes’ here prove mere pretense, yielding no harvests whatsoever. While squandering tens of millions of yen on Hokkaido, you feign ignorance as wantonly obliterate Kanto’s prime plots valued at 150 to 200 yen per tan.”
Such partiality in governance yields these consequences.

“I shall now briefly address the terrible calamity of mining pollution.” First, plants withered from the poison. Fish could not be caught. Human lives grew shorter. Given this reality, it had been the long-established scholarly consensus that copper mine toxins would harm plants and animals. Had the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce officials been honest, that alone would have sufficed.

Yet despite this academic consensus, they rendered it incomprehensible through their perverse reasoning.

“To begin with a recent example—what became of the Agricultural College’s test results from Meiji 25 [1892]?”

The previous year’s experiments at Tochigi Prefecture’s Agricultural Experiment Station, along with two lectures delivered in Meiji 22 [1889] and Meiji 29 [1896] by Miyake Shū of the Medical University—who had come to Tochigi specifically to warn of mining pollution’s health hazards—should have settled the matter.

“Through countless investigations, we conclusively understood what these mine toxins affected. That the Ministry claims ignorance defies all reason.”

The smelting plant’s smoke damage did more than wither forests and denude peaks—its chimneys spewed fumes that rode winds east and west across miles of mountainside, leaving every visible slope barren.

Not merely trees perished. Bamboo thickets, grasses, even mosses—all withered utterly.

Within this smoke mingled a peculiar ash.

“Let me explain—when this ash touches foliage, the leaves shrivel instantly.”

“This falls to chemists’ expertise; I’ll spare details. The essential fact remains—trees died.”

Since Japan’s founding, mountains spared the axe had developed root networks like woven nets—roots that gripped sliding soil and buttressed crumbling boulders.

By felling these guardians, they unleashed cascading rockfalls.

“Now that four or five years have passed and these roots rot away, catastrophic collapses become inevitable. What disasters may follow? None can say.”

Last year’s floods hadn’t yet reached this critical stage.

All this had been foreseeable.

At present, desiccated water sources trickled sediment downstream—sand from smelters joined crumbling mountainsides’ grit—until rivers silted shut.

This siltation differed from natural processes in the Tone, Kinu and Kitakami rivers—here they’d engineered sediment channels deliberately, making riverbeds rise faster than nature ever intended.

What we must fear for the future is that I must now clearly state this mountain will collapse at least once.
"It’s not as though you’ve utterly neglected regulation—you did issue replanting orders after deforestation."
"When seven thousand chō of trees were felled under your authority and these orders given—if we examine current progress—only fifty-three chō stand replanted."
"Even were every last tree replaced now—a full century must pass before their growth could stabilize these slopes."
"This demonstrates how completely mining operators have defaulted on their fundamental duties."
Therefore—though this digresses slightly—when astute members from Gunma and Tochigi Prefectural Assemblies convened last July to deliberate urgent embankment measures against impending Watarase River disasters... then came September’s catastrophic flood. Grave though it was—if we now implement landslide prevention plans—some portion may yet be mitigated.

“Given this situation, I must briefly address the matters of this mining pollution and flooding.
“As floods have caused disasters in every prefecture, I will not elaborate further.
“The only distinction with Gunma, Tochigi, Saitama, and Ibaraki’s floods lies in their contamination by poison.
“While accounts from Echigo, Okayama, and other regions describe truly devastating floods, ours contain poison—a distinction demanding your discerning judgment.”
Thus, the bamboo growing along these embankments withered away.
“This”—he displayed bamboo on the podium—“is embankment bamboo.
“This year’s bamboo has perished entirely.
“The roots wither from mining toxins; though they ought to grow long, all have decayed to this pitiful state.” His voice sharpened. “Regarding embankments—I hear Public Works Bureau officials now argue bamboos hinder flood control! They claim uncleared bamboo makes it impossible to detect whether breaches come from ant holes or rat holes during floods—even suggesting it’s *convenient* when poison kills bamboos without intervention!”
“Tokugawa-era embankments,” he continued, “used bamboo revetments here, grass there—each section built through twenty years’ observation of river currents.
“Unlike today’s levee scholars educated abroad who disregard local hydrology.
“Where bamboo sufficed for protection—they used bamboo; where grass served—they used grass! That was Tokugawa engineering.
“Ancient embankments required bamboo at critical points.
“To claim improvement by killing bamboos defies reason!
“I submit this appeal because breached embankments from such negligence have caused immense harm.”
He gestured emphatically. “Not only do embankment bamboos wither thus—as you gentlemen from flooded regions know—but our levees remain rigidly fixed in width and height.”
Yet since Meiji 22 [1889], he noted coldly, Watarase River’s bed had demonstrably risen six feet—requiring corresponding embankment elevation to prevent overflow.
But deforestation forced torrents from mountains into parched riverbeds—sudden surges arriving without warning.
Identical water volumes grew destructive through concentrated force.
Downstream communities learned of floods only when upstream levees burst.

The current of this water had also become extremely rapid.
"Regarding this matter, the Ministry of Home Affairs must have compiled statistics."
"What previously required ten hours now arrives in three; what demanded twenty reaches its destination in seven or eight—thus it comes when no flood prevention preparations can be made."
Because of this, the embankments could scarcely withstand the water—not through any fatigue-induced failure, but because it arrived all at once.
Just as one may drink any quantity from a cup if taken gradually yet chokes when gulped down at once, so too was it inevitable that the embankment would be destroyed.

“Even examining Tochigi Prefecture’s statistics alone proves astonishing.”
“Tochigi Prefecture comprises eight districts—with flood damage affecting 19,000 chōbu of land—of which three Watarase River districts alone account for 13,000 chōbu within that total.”
“Within these flood-damaged areas, embankment breaches have turned 6,019 chōbu into wasteland.”
“Were this ordinary wasteland, five to ten years of cultivation could restore it—but with poison mixed throughout, no recourse remains.”
“This soil must be entirely removed.”
“Where this toxic soil measures five sun deep in some places and one jō in others—all must be excavated.”
“How might this removal proceed?”
“With nowhere to dispose of earth, they build soil mounds in field corners while cultivating what remains—a process fraught with difficulties.”
“When mining pollution infiltrates fields, those lands perish—digging out contaminated soil to mound while converting other sections costs more than new land purchases; economically nonsensical.”

Next comes the necessity to reduce land taxes due to mining pollution.
The land taxes for mining pollution-affected areas in Tochigi, Gunma, Ibaraki, Saitama, and other prefectures must be reduced and exemptions also granted.
Flood-prone areas inherently develop low land prices due to constant flood damage.
While ordinary floods don't necessitate price reductions, infiltration of poison makes such reductions imperative.
Ordinary wasteland recovers in five or ten years, but with nowhere to dispose of toxin-laden sand, even building embankments and ceasing mining would leave this farmland dead—what might be nominally reclaimed as cultivated land would amount to mere pretense.
Already today, 1,600 chō of land have turned to desert.
Left abandoned among over thirty thousand chō, all will meet this fate.
"This deterioration won't occur overnight—there remains a five- or six-year window—but without halting it today, complete ruin remains inevitable."
"In implementing these tax exemptions and reductions—for those officials concerned about fiscal matters—take note: the entire Watarase River coastal area possesses fertile soil yet bears low land prices precisely because it's flood-prone."
"Irrigation water zones command high land valuations."
"Yet when stating transaction prices, those irrigation areas trade cheaply."
"As for embankment-exterior lands in these flood zones—plots once traded at 200 yen—none now find buyers even at 1 or 2 yen."
Originally, riverbank inundations brought fallen leaves from deep mountains; decomposing during floods, these became fertilizer that enriched fields and yielded abundant winter wheat.
But now that poison replaces fertilizer, 200-yen lands have plummeted to 1 or 2 yen.

There are three types of farmland afflicted by this mining pollution.
The first concerns irrigation water lands.
The second involves what we term backflow—during floods, surging reverse currents circle behind embankments to damage fields within the levees. There exist thirteen backflow points along the Watarase River’s three coastal districts.
In this way, thirteen distributaries allow inverted water flow into the embankments—this forms one category.
The third occurs where water breaches dikes to forge new wastelands.
In essence, what once delivered fertilizer now brings poison.
Therefore, regarding wasteland matters I must briefly address: ordinary wastelands being natural disasters entail losses borne by landowners and the state alone. But when compounded by artificial harm—the forced discharge of mining toxins—this not only establishes compensation rights but constitutes damage irrecoverable within five or ten years. I must urgently stress this distinction to you all.
Those managing taxation should have heeded this sooner.
Why has the Ministry of Finance not compelled responsible ministers to act? Why neglect their duty to confront the Minister of Agriculture and Commerce?

“As providing a detailed explanation of each type of damage would take too long, I shall instead read aloud the enumerated items in place of continuing my address.”
The items number fifty-four in total—personal damages include:

Loss of real estate due to wastelandification of fields and paddies.
Decline in land value due to deterioration of soil quality.
Decline in actual transaction prices due to decreased land value.
Deterioration of soil quality leading to increased fertilizer usage.
Reduction in harvests due to wastelandification of fields and paddies and deterioration of soil quality.
Loss of feed and fertilizer due to damage to straw stalks.
Loss of livestock feed and fertilizer due to contamination of cut grass.
Loss of soil fertility due to contamination of compost.
Loss of homes and storehouses due to contamination by toxic water.
Loss of furniture and household goods due to contamination of homes and storehouses.
Loss of grains, vegetables, and other foodstuffs due to contamination of homes and storehouses.
Death of livestock and poultry due to contamination of homes and storehouses.
Increase in costs for replacing subfloor soil and sand due to toxic mud infiltration.
Blockage of water veins due to soil contamination and increase in costs for new well drilling.
Withering of reeds and miscanthus due to contamination of wilderness areas and increase in costs for purchasing thatching materials for grass-thatched roofs.
Cessation of fisheries due to contamination of rivers and marshes.
Increase in nutritional supplementation costs due to loss of grains, vegetables, and other food and beverages.
Increase in nutritional supplementation costs due to cessation of fisheries.

Shortage of clothing, food, and shelter due to loss of property.
Deficiency in bodily nutrition due to poverty and destitution.
Harm from consumption of contaminated materials due to poverty and destitution.
Pollution of drinking water due to contamination of well water.
Harm from bonfire smoke due to contamination of firewood and charcoal.
Respiratory harm caused by evaporation of toxic water.
Harm from physical overexertion due to deterioration of soil quality.
Extinction of ownership rights due to land desolation.
Extinction of voting rights due to loss of property.

Regarding regional damages:

Loss of communal land due to land desolation.
Loss of communal houses and buildings due to toxic water infiltration.
Increase in communal well dredging costs due to toxic water infiltration.
Loss of tax revenue sources due to declining land values.
Loss of communal wealth due to decreased land transaction prices.
Withering of embankment vegetation—bamboo, trees, grasses, and moss—from mining toxins.
Embankment breaches caused by withered vegetation.
Loss of roads and bridges from embankment failures.
Deforestation of watershed forests to meet copper mine's fuel demands.
Soil erosion and riverbed siltation from deforestation.
Decline in boat traffic due to silted riverbeds.
Loss of irrigation canals from mining contamination.
Increased flood control costs from breached embankments.
Increased public works expenses from lost roads and bridges.
Rising relief costs due to poverty-induced miscarriages.
Decreased households and population from destitution-driven migration.
Diminished self-governance rights from reduced population.

Turning to the damages suffered by the nation:

Reduction in land area due to desolated terrain.
Loss of national territory through land degradation.
Destruction of state-owned buildings from toxic water infiltration.
Decline in treasury revenue following diminished tax bases.
Weakening of national strength through depleted local finances.
Growth in state subsidies necessitated by overwhelmed municipalities.
Shortage of fit military recruits owing to health damage.
Deterioration of public education amidst widespread poverty.
Rise in criminal activity fueled by economic desperation.
Interruption of postal and telegraph services from collapsed infrastructure.

As this must be tedious for you, I shall have the stenographer record it instead; though I have not yet read even half, I shall stop here.
“There are over fifty such items, but ultimately, these people fall into poverty—when poverty strikes them, it comes suddenly: they rapidly lose their property, suddenly become destitute, abruptly lack clothing, food, and shelter, and swiftly diminish their nutritional capacity.”
“Particularly grave are the sanitary harms: even when farmers keep horses, there is no straw to feed them.”
“Even if they cut the grass left after floods recede, they cannot feed it to their horses.”
“This is already beyond argument, and the sanitary harms arising therefrom are more than one can fathom.”
“When considering the decline in nutritional capacity resulting from toxicity, according to Meiji 14 (1881) statistics from Tochigi Prefecture, there were 2,773 people engaged in fishing, but by Meiji 21 (1888), this number had decreased to 787.”
“Furthermore, regarding vegetables—take the case of Niwata in Hane, Ashikaga District, who possesses over fifteen chō of fields around his main and new residences yet cannot grow a single vegetable across those fifteen chō of farmland.”
"Even if I state it here today, I cannot depict its true reality."
"Despite having over fifteen chō of land attached to residential areas where not a single vegetable can be grown, they still want to try cultivating them—so they move aside two or three shaku of soil and sow seeds in the middle. But when the wind blows, sand falls into it and the vegetables wither; even when it rains, they wither."
The same applies to fish.
"There isn’t a single fish—it’s not that there are none at all; sometimes there are."
When there are fish, it is always autumn.
When autumn lingers and the weather remains unchanged, the poison settles to the riverbed, so fish gradually come.
They die from mere light rain. Why do river fish perish due to scant rainfall? Because during floods, poison clings thickly to embankments—grass and trees become saturated with toxins. When even a little rain falls, it washes the ground and dislodges this poison; should water carrying embankment toxins flow into the river in any quantity, the fish die. This remains true even without floods.
Therefore, even today, vegetables do not grow.
Even so, these farmers remain deluded, thinking that since the ground appears clean, sowing seeds might yield vegetables or planting potatoes might produce a crop.
It’s not that fish cannot be caught at all; some still keep fishing tools, saying that fish do come at times.

It was a pitiful tale of people consuming poison through their very sustenance. When floods occurred, mining poison would infiltrate the fields along with the water—though higher areas remained untouched—resulting in both contaminated and uncontaminated water sources. Rice husks exposed to poisoned water would rot, as would those touched by clean water; peeling away their husks revealed blackened unpolished rice grains they called small black rice. Attempting to polish this into white rice only reduced it to powder that could never become proper rice. They would grind this unpolished rice as-is into flour using mortars. Up to this point, the processes remained identical—it was here that poisoned and unpoisoned materials diverged.

With untainted flour, one could make dumplings and rice cakes; but poisoned flour lost all adhesive quality, becoming useless for either purpose. When this happened, they should have discarded it—yet pitifully, they would throw it into miso soup or similar dishes, consuming it like buckwheat chaff. "As you see here, gentlemen," Tanaka declared, "many eat this poison unknowingly." He continued: "Some consume it knowingly—poverty leaves them no choice."

"This dreadful reality—though I digress—shows how poisoned and clean waters separate here." His voice sharpened: "The same applies to straw—it rots completely."

"Uncontaminated straw becomes fertilizer," he explained while holding up samples, "while poisoned straw does not." With rising intensity: "Not only useless as fertilizer—burning it produces something resembling coarse tea leaves rather than ash."

Gesturing to exhibits: "The locals know poisoned materials well—I needn't present every sample here," he conceded while displaying rotted straw ash, "but observe this result from burning contaminated straw."

Formally presenting evidence: "These are Exhibits One through Twenty." He arranged mulberry leaves on the desk—some poison-stained brown, others flood-damaged but untainted green. "The distinction needs no explanation." Finally producing sesame seeds: "These too bear mining poison."

Concluding briskly: "Washed rice samples and others await inspection in the conference room."

"As for population statistics—specifically households with toxic water intrusion—the four prefectures of Gunma, Tochigi, Ibaraki and Saitama show 16,470 affected households comprising 98,880 individuals.
This denotes cases where toxic water physically invaded residential structures.
In other Gunma areas like Shinshukugai district of Kiryū Town and both adjacent townships—where wells remain uncontaminated but residents draw drinking water from the poisoned Watarase River—the combined total reaches approximately 110,000 people. However, as comprehensive well surveys remain incomplete today, I shall confine my statement to confirming 98,880 confirmed cases of domestic infiltration for your records.
Why do responsible authorities abandon such critical issues?
Even granting their negligence—why do other ministries fail to bring matters of taxation, maritime transport, education and civil rights before the Minister of Agriculture and Commerce?"

Additionally, I must declare that mining poison's harm extends to fundamental rights.
This requires no elaborate explanation - property vanishes abruptly, public rights perish entirely.
Furthermore, consider this circumstance: though bearing education expenses, they cannot send children to elementary schools - schools being utterly out of reach, with siblings torn from parents through forced separation - what words could possibly convey this devastation's cruel reality?
Even marriage stands defiled.
When we speak of marriage's defilement, it means while some may marry into these poison-blighted regions, none will marry out from them - an insult endured that stains even their honor.

Given these violations of rights, one would expect the Minister of Justice to take some notice—yet he remains oblivious.
While subjecting them to such misery on one hand, what manner of governance allows mining operators to run rampant on the other?
This mining operator is none other than Furukawa Ichibei.
While it may not be solely his personal intent, such profiteers inevitably attract like-minded underlings who commit countless misdeeds unbeknownst to their master. Thus, though our censure is not directed solely at this single mining operator, we must name him—as the responsible party.
"The clerks commit wicked deeds; their rampant behavior is truly appalling."
“As I have stated before: they cut down forests without replanting them as promised; ravaged over 35,000 chō of land; deprived people even of their rights; poisoned 100,000 souls; and not only gorged themselves on glory—but whenever local citizens attempt to petition, they immediately seize control of prefectural officials, while district functionaries have become little more than slaves to Furukawa.”
“They perpetrate such violence upon the nation and ruin its people—amidst it all, he alone profits.”
“If he himself were to say this, that would be one matter—but when outsiders or officials proclaim that operation to be a source of national revenue.”
“They fell mountain trees as if committing theft, harm tens of thousands of people, and lay waste to over thirty thousand chō of farmland—yet claim it constitutes a national revenue source because it generates profit. If uttered by those ignorant of the facts, one might let it pass—but when those who should know better, especially officials in positions of authority, dare to make such statements, it becomes truly inexcusable.”
Money earned through such means as these cannot be called profit.
“True profit refers to that which is obtained through righteous means—that which restrains oneself and benefits society. Can money gained through acts akin to banditry truly be called profit?”
“What shall we call this—robbery? Stolen goods? I struggle to find a name for it. Gentlemen, what would you call such men? I appeal to you—I can find no fitting term.”

To permit a single mining operator to exist beyond the law and act with unchecked impunity in this manner was equivalent to establishing extraterritorial rights within our own nation and granting them enforcement authority.
The Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Justice must themselves maintain vigilance—when foreign residency is permitted, by what means shall we compel outsiders to obey our nation’s laws?
Furthermore, I must declare unequivocally that this copper mine’s operator obstructs the advancement of other legitimate mining enterprises.
“With such an operator in existence, other miners face ruin.
Why? Because as society declares: mining itself stands condemned—its poisons blight vegetation and corrupt human hearts, while claims of ‘national interest’ are nothing but a farce! That place spawns villains! With this pestilence rooted in Tochigi and Gunma, permitting copper mines elsewhere would prove intolerable.—Not only does the Ashio Copper Mine defame honorable miners and hinder their work even in less afflicted regions, but this damage has now reached irreversible extremes.”

Even among copper mines—take for instance the Besshi Copper Mine in Iyo—it lies a mere eight ri from the sea.
The necessity of examining Tochigi Prefecture’s geography stems precisely from this distinction.
Ashio Copper Mine sits at Japan’s very heartland—evident even on maps.
From this central position, its effluent flows into Kantō’s flatlands.
This poison reaches Kiryū and Ashikaga—Kantō’s most renowned and densely populated textile regions—and regardless of direction cannot reach the sea without traversing fifty or a hundred ri.
Moreover, upon spilling onto level terrain, it devastates fertile fields.
Copper mines along coastal margins—whose runoff descends through mountain streams to the sea—bear no equivalence; thus initiating mining operations here demanded thorough preliminary surveys.
Fundamentally permitting them to establish extractive works here—installing massive machinery at refineries and operating recklessly—constituted a foundational miscalculation.

The harm defies full articulation through words alone, yet its magnitude compels us to ask: Why have the affected citizens not risen in protest until now? Why do they refrain from raising their voices in outcry? Is their response not unconscionably belated? And even today, do their voices not remain intolerably muted?
To this end, I must elucidate exhaustively the circumstances of these afflicted people and offer full justification on their behalf.
I must compel those holding power to grant this matter their fullest hearing.
For when conducting inspections of the disaster zones—guided by district chiefs serving as Furukawa’s stewards—merely surveying superficially less-damaged areas before departing constitutes gross malpractice. Therefore, I resolve to provide comprehensive instruction on proper investigative methodologies.

In today's circumstances of the affected areas downstream of the Watarase River, they had reached a state where they could no longer raise their voices.

Fundamentally, the people of this land were unacquainted with indignation—bereft of economic acumen and any grasp of rights.
For they were farmers who dutifully cultivated fields: tilling in spring, weeding through summer, removing grasses under the scorching midsummer sun—only for floods to arrive when rice ears emerged in July and August, reducing all toil to nothingness.
This was before mining poison existed.
Even absent pollution, when floods instantly erased a year's labor, they could never establish household budgets.
Though one *chō* might yield fifty or sixty bales, such calculations eluded them—budgeting remained foreign.
Regarding rights: while labor's reward is one's due, entire years' work dissolved like foam and was dismissed as heaven's wrath.
Having dwelled there since time beyond memory, they resigned themselves to disasters as celestial will.
Their capacity for anger paled compared to other regions'.
No recompense came to those who labored.
Yet rewards reached those who did not.
To explain: though floods rotted rice and denied harvests, fertilizer arrived and fish multiplied.
When idlers reaped rewards while workers' efforts vanished like bubbles, minds grew addled—rights and economy both lost.
Not that rights were unknown; known yet abandoned as heaven's decree.
Nor that economics eluded them; known yet budgeting impossible—such was local custom.
Moreover, they remained unaware of mining poison's decade-long creep—firstly because floodwaters carried it undetected.
Unknowing, they blamed poor harvests on insects or climate.
When crops failed utterly after ten years and poison was discovered—it was already too late.

"Though this may seem an exceedingly drawn-out discourse, there is one matter I must address. Floods bring terror yet also fertilizer and fish; indeed, before mining pollution existed, there were times when floods were even welcomed—instances where natural disasters met with approval. Now floods leave them unable to harvest either rice or fish; that both have become impossible stems solely from mining poison. For ten years they remained ignorant of this pollution, during which time it hid among tolerable natural disasters and received unwitting welcome. This constitutes one reason for their decade-long unawareness—the poison had mingled with what they perceived as natural calamities. Now that understanding has dawned, the problem reveals its labyrinthine nature: one must comprehend chemistry, public health, rights, economics, national governance, politics, and society before raising one's voice about this matter. For these afflicted people, this presents an insurmountable challenge indeed. Next comes the question of funding sources. Even when aware of the pollution, they lack means to finance petitions or activism. Had local self-governance been more developed, town councils would naturally resolve this through official proceedings—yet tragically, these coastal communities appear less enlightened than others and instead thrust this burden upon the victims themselves. Having endured disaster with no recourse for funding, they swallowed tears in silence; though today resolutions are made through municipal funds, throughout that interim period they remained utterly powerless."

Another matter: what of the government itself?
First, I shall speak about local officials.
——(At this moment, Yoshimoto Eikichi approached the podium and whispered to Tanaka)——"As I had previously stated—though this must surely cause Your Honors great inconvenience—given that this year brings many occasions for respite much like years past, if Your Honors should deign to rescue these victims, I humbly beg your esteemed attention a while longer."
“Now, when smallpox breaks out, local offices make great commotion—and this commotion is entirely proper.”
“Yet they exert disproportionate effort on matters like mulberry planting methods and inspecting silkworm eggs for pébrine, while feigning ignorance toward this mining pollution.”
“Even when there are 100,000 people consuming poison, not a single official order is issued regarding this.”
As early as Meiji 14 (1881), Fujikawa Tamechika, then Governor of Tochigi Prefecture, issued an official order prohibiting the consumption of fish from the Watarase River.
In Meiji 14, when Governor Fujikawa still served during an era of integrity, he issued such an order; yet today, despite over 100,000 people being poisoned by last year’s floods, they say not a word about mining pollution.
Even when warnings come from us, it proves futile.
They forbid committing it to writing—for once written down, awareness would spread and they would suppress it.
Through such cruelty, the people of Tochigi and Gunma prefectures endure inhumane treatment from district and prefectural officials to the extent of being forbidden from uttering “mining pollution.”
If one were to abandon all concern, conversely, district officials race about east and west, deploying every interference tactic to commit unimaginable evils alone.
Under these circumstances, can the people possibly raise their voices?
Even as I explain this, you might think: “Were the poison truly severe, the people would have resorted to bamboo spears and straw banners—donning raincoats to appeal at palace gates.” Yet through varied circumstances—whether seizing prefectural officials or arresting locally prominent figures to enforce suppression—this extends beyond Tochigi and Gunma’s victims. Even among groups of fifty or thirty moderately educated persons, once two or three leaders are bribed, the rest fall silent. While such practices do not exist within the Imperial Diet itself, beyond its gates they indeed prevail.
To outside observers, countless acts defy human comprehension; thus by apprehending those who seem clever among the victims, they ensure voices never rise again—a foregone conclusion.
Though I loathe to speak of such matters, I must say these words in defense of the affected citizens.

Another factor was that people readily perceived tangible matters, yet when it came to intangible ones, their recognition arrived inexcusably late—by the time they became aware, the damage had already been done.
Disasters such as the Gifu-Aichi earthquake, the Sanriku tsunami, or volcanic eruptions—even the greatest fool could recognize these.
Ministers would rush to the scene; engineers would rush to the scene.
Yet this issue of mining pollution proved insidious in nature; thus, the public remained unaware.
While it might be unavoidable that society remained unaware, when those who should have known—the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce—and the officials charged with regulation had reached such depths of ignorance, what manner of affair was this?
First, ordinary people found it difficult to make judgments.
To proceed further—while the Gifu-Aichi earthquake, the Sanriku tsunami, and floods across various prefectures presented truly harrowing scenes—these were natural disasters.
Even natural disasters—the government would handle these.
Had this mining pollution incident been a natural disaster compounded by human-caused harm, then human-caused harm should have been remedied by human means—this stood as established principle.
They did not follow this established course of action.
This state of affairs defied comprehension.

"It should be incomprehensible—that having inflicted harm through human agency, they could then conceal it through human means. Natural disasters such as earthquakes cannot be suppressed by human means, but since mining pollution is a poison inflicted through human agency, they employ human means to declare, 'There is no poison.' 'The poison is diluted.' The petitioners, clamoring about this and that, all seize upon the floods as an opportunity—blaming every instance of flood damage on mining pollution—while officials dismiss this as mere excuse-making. If the mine operator scatters money and exerts influence, it’s only natural that those unaware of the true situation would find the earlier claims they heard to be reasonable. It is understandable that you gentlemen, unaware of these circumstances, might credit opposing arguments—yet the authorities tasked with regulation comprehend even less than the citizens of the afflicted regions! To say the victims’ silence stems from abjectness is to ignore that the officials of the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce have remained silent a hundredfold more—whether from cowardice or ignorance, I find myself at a loss for words to describe these bureaucrats. What epithet could suffice? To call them maggots would be too kind; to name them fools too mild—what title would you have me bestow?"

“Gentlemen, behold!
The Kantō plain lies flat and vast—truly, nothing obstructs the view.
That these fertile fields spanning dozens of leagues stand ravaged, with none in today’s government rising to save them—what manner of governance is this?
The clique-dominated regime you so revile has transformed these bountiful lands into deserts—nay, continues transforming them even now!
To injure these pristine fields and poison their guileless people—this is the clique government’s way! They treat Tohoku’s citizens with such cruelty, leaving them utterly helpless—only to craft polished rebuttals when questioned.
What rebuttal could they muster? ‘We’ll hire scholars and install machinery to stem the poison’s flow’—let them confine such tabletop debates to reasonable measure!
They slaughter people then conduct medical research—if such answers satisfy Your Honors, so be it.
I shall conclude by affirming that from the 24th year’s questioning until this day, the government has spoken nothing but lies.”

The relationship between mining pollution and politics—successive governments had maintained anarchic negligence toward this copper mine while remaining utterly silent regarding Furukawa Ichibei.
The deception by previous ministers manifested in their December 1891 response to our inquiry: they falsely claimed installation of toxin-blocking machinery since that time, with each device purportedly prepared and scholars allegedly engaged in continuous remediation efforts.
When the Diet dissolved that year and we submitted our second inquiry in 1892, their rebuttal again grandly asserted installation of ore sedimentation tanks while pledging absolute prevention of future contamination—empty promises devoid of sincere implementation that collapsed when we submitted a third inquiry. Abandoning technical pretense, they secretly ordered local governors to mediate between victims and Furukawa.
These governors addressed public health hazards through monetary transactions.
Their mediation script ran: "We've reinstalled sedimentation tanks—accept this guarantee against future poisoning. As partial compensation for past damages, take this inadequate sum." Trusting gubernatorial authority, locals accepted trifling payments through deception.
Subsequently claiming contamination cessation, our own governor even dispatched effusive letters of gratitude to himself.
Prefectural assembly members who facilitated these mediations remained fundamentally ignorant of pollution realities.
While reprehensible that officials conducted such acts, I refrain from condemning their ignorance; no governor would dare such brazenness without Home Ministry directives. Having twice perjured themselves before the Diet about pollution containment and finding third testimony impossible, they resorted to vague claims about gubernatorial arbitration—until we confronted them with Agricultural College test results during our second inquiry, forcing admission of contamination's existence while arguing it remained below cessation thresholds and promising renewed filtration through sedimentation tanks.
Thus they perpetuated regional deception through gubernatorial proxies, graduating from mere fraud to systematic swindling.

In Meiji 26 [1893], when we resolved to question the evident inefficacy of these so-called ore pulverization collectors, the Diet was dissolved.
When we sought to raise questions again in Meiji 27 [1894], the Diet was dissolved once more.
Then erupted the First Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895). Under such circumstances—far from pursuing inquiries—we suppressed our convictions to maintain national unity, avoiding any display of internal discord before foreign eyes. Such was the prevailing ethos of that era.
Thus throughout Meiji 27 and 28 [1894-1895], we abstained from formal questioning.
It was precisely during the Itō Cabinet that we withheld our challenges, yet now under the present administration, conditions have compelled us to resume these interrogations.
However, when the toxic deluge of Meiji 27 [1894] struck, the mine operators—in panic—commenced deploying district officials from November of that year to beguile local communities.
Their stratagem unfolded thus: after extensive scheming, these officials would arrive under pretexts of acting upon confidential orders from district chiefs or as their proxies, summon villagers, and coerce them into stamping pledges of perpetual silence—exchanging seals for payments of two yen or one yen per tan of land.
The deceptions manifested in manifold forms—alternating between threats and cajolery.
Some propagated outright falsehoods: “The Ashio Copper Mine’s veins will be exhausted within a year! Take one yen now—two if you can! Even fifty sen proves advantageous! This disclosure remains strictly between us.”
As these fabrications spread, a grotesque competition emerged over compensation rates—fifty sen versus thirty sen deemed “advantageous” for eternal silence. Written renunciations of grievance bore seals obtained for sums ranging from five yen down to one yen, then twenty-five sen—nay, even seven sen or five sen—with some affixing their marks for a mere five sen.
In Ebisawa Village, Ōra District, Gunma Prefecture, this became universal practice—the highest payment being twenty-five sen.

In this manner—having employed various means of deception and used money to obtain written pledges—they now claim there are no grievances; yet there exist those today who assert these documents cover over half of the mining-polluted areas.
If it were mere ruffians and villains, that would be one matter—but when district officials commit such acts, it cannot be tolerated. It was for this reason I raised questions in Meiji 29 [1896] following the Sino-Japanese War’s conclusion—questions focused precisely here.
To this too, the Minister of Agriculture and Commerce offers no rebuttal.
Recent reports indicate a certain district official in Nitta District, Gunma Prefecture—under pretext of irrigation works—has been clamoring that with numerous mining cessation petitions emerging lately, funds could surely be extracted from Furukawa Ichibei through negotiation; declaring “this is where we obtain the money,” they spearheaded district officials in procuring some 10,000 yen from Furukawa Ichibei to dupe affected citizens—yet not all people are fools to be thus trifled with, hence word spreads of fierce opposition recently erupting.
This exemplifies precisely how district officials operate.
“Minister of Home Affairs—regarding this matter, why have you neither fortified your essential duties nor conferred with the Minister of Agriculture and Commerce?”
The most egregious instance occurred in November of Meiji 27 [1894].
“November of Meiji 27 fell during the Sino-Japanese War—amidst fighting near Haicheng where soldiers froze to death pleading for adequate provisions—even as conscripts from these poisoned lands were dispatched to battlefronts, [officials] exploited the absence of these able-bodied men to coerce remaining villagers—elderly, women, children—into stamping seals [on agreements] through threats and deceit. However intense their avarice, for those bearing public office to become Furukawa Ichibei’s slaves defies all reason! That such individuals remain district officials today signifies Japan lacks governance—were a government present, these wretches would face severe disciplinary measures.”
“Thus they press—‘Here’s one yen,’ ‘Here’s two yen’—demanding seal stamps on these [documents].”
“In entire villages, only one or two wretches would knowingly stamp their seals.”
“To those refusing money and withholding seals, they dispatch thugs; making ruffians drink sake to threaten—‘Your refusal blocks others from taking it!’—then beating them.”
“Under these circumstances, none dare venture out—and indeed some have been beaten and assaulted.”
As darkness veiled the night, identifying perpetrators proved impossible; however, the stationed police officer thoroughly investigated the scene’s condition.
Let me name the beaten man: Yokotsuka Kichigorō of Hata, Azuma Village, Ashikaga District, Tochigi Prefecture.
Should an honest soul chance to exist, they beat them.

In Nitta District, Gunma Prefecture stands Kanayama; in Tochigi Prefecture rises Karasuyama—places where mushrooms flourish, drawing annual autumn visits from His Majesty himself for royal foraging.
Yet beneath these mountains fester villages choked with mining pollution.
During His Majesty’s 1881 tour of Hokuriku, imperial benevolence had showered even widows and orphans with gifts—loyal servants receiving due honors.
Now, as His virtuous reign shines ever brighter, guides dare lead visitors to these poisoned foothills.
What manner of men conduct such tours?
Our people remain steadfastly loyal—when graced by imperial presence, they labor on roadworks without complaint, harboring no resentment toward the throne.
But when these guides parade through villages where gaunt-faced peasants still breathe toxic air—when royal mushroom hunts unfold amidst unaddressed ruin—the lie of pristine officialdom crumbles.
Gentlemen! This appeal I make for the Imperial Household itself!
And you Cabinet Ministers—mark this well—must henceforth exercise utmost vigilance!

We first advised the government regarding mining pollution and submitted our inquiries in the 24th year [of Meiji], at which time the polluted area measured over 1,600 chōbu.
Yet they constructed this and that pretext—claiming they would eliminate mining pollution through scholars’ efforts or prevent its discharge through mechanical inventions—telling lies three times over, during which period [the contamination] has now spread to cover an area exceeding 30,000 chōbu.
Even now, they appear to maintain such notions—whether relying on scholars’ assistance or installing machinery to prevent the poison from flowing.
If that were not the case, why have they not ceased mining operations before any inquiry documents were submitted?
“Our questions are not raised out of pleasure; it is because the facts cannot be ignored that we bring this appeal.”
“It is only because we must now raise these questions after over sixty days of Diet proceedings—not because we take any pleasure in doing so—that we act: Why have you not halted this to this day? Do you presume yourselves capable of offering any rebuttal?”
“Or do you believe that by relying on local ruffians or district officials to obtain thumbprints, that alone settles the matter?”
“Even should they deceive all affected citizens, the State will not consent.”
“Even if all affected citizens are deceived into affixing their seals with twenty or thirty sen, such matters are unknown to the State—the State does not consent.”
“The State, taking a comprehensive view, weighs the balance of interests and protects the people’s rights to the utmost; if the government fails to protect them, we shall.”
“Is the government aware that the Imperial Constitution explicitly states, ‘Japanese subjects shall not be deprived of their property rights’?”
“The Mining Ordinance states: ‘When prospecting operations harm public interest, the director of the competent mining supervision office may revoke previously granted approvals or permits; regarding mining operations, the Minister of Agriculture and Commerce may do the same.’”
Despite these constitutional laws being manifestly clear in their protection of public interest and imperial subjects, they do not protect these people.
If they do not protect the people, the people have no obligation to obey the laws.
Far from there being no obligation to obey the laws—the government itself is actively creating circumstances where innocent citizens cannot possibly comply with them.
Such is the situation.
The government does not use laws to protect the people; it does not protect public interest.
The people have no obligation to obey the laws; they have rendered it no obligation.
Therefore, in accordance with the Diet Law, we have submitted these questions.
It is my expectation that the Cabinet Ministers will provide an appropriate response befitting their station, taking full responsibility under Article 55 of the Imperial Constitution.

“I humbly apologize for having caused prolonged inconvenience to everyone.”