Pathway to Japanese Literature

At present, what society demands is that since existing histories are mistaken, they must be revised to write a true history. However, in such cases, the notion that history is mistaken appears to carry two distinct implications.

The first implication is that ancient texts previously considered to describe historical facts do not actually do so—for example, the *Kojiki* and *Nihon Shoki* do not record historical facts of antiquity.
This stems from a failure to distinguish between historical materials and history itself—while the *Kojiki* and *Nihon Shoki* are sources for ancient history, they are not ancient history per se. Thus, even if they contain non-factual accounts, it cannot be said that history itself is mistaken.
Since historical materials are typically a mixture of truth and falsehood, one must discard the false portions and adopt the true ones as historical sources; moreover, as most materials do not contain descriptions covering all aspects of multifaceted national life but only record matters pertaining to one or two aspects, it is necessary to scrutinize the materials themselves to determine which aspects' data should be sought from them.
This is what necessitates critical examination of historical materials.
For instance, even in articles within the *Kojiki* and *Nihon Shoki* that superficially appear to be records of historical facts, upon close examination, many cannot be considered factual; thus, discerning their veracity becomes necessary. Similarly, narratives such as those of the Age of the Gods, which at first glance seem implausible as factual records, must be assessed to determine what aspects of history they serve as sources for.
The matters narrated in these stories—that is, the words and actions of the characters active within them—are not factual. However, the fact that these narratives were created is itself a historical reality, and the ideas expressed through them also existed as concrete phenomena. Therefore, while they do not serve as sources for external historical events, they constitute invaluable materials for the history of literature and thought.
By correctly using such historical materials in accordance with their nature, history is constructed.
This distinction between historical materials and history itself is something all researchers in historiography recognize, but since the general public does not deeply consider this matter and regards materials such as the *Kojiki* and *Nihon Shoki* as literal history, it would seem this gives rise to the aforementioned assertions.

The second implication refers to how histories written by historians—failing to critically examine the aforementioned source materials, or doing so erroneously—result in incorrect distinctions between truth and falsehood, a failure to comprehend the nature of historical materials, or deliberate distortion of facts due to some bias and the imposition of arbitrary interpretations, thereby producing histories riddled with falsehoods.

Now，in either of these two senses，what was generally considered Japan’s ancient history up until then could be said to be mistaken．Then what was true ancient history? It had yet to be established．By this I meant that no history had been constructed which was acknowledged by all．The fact that critical analysis of historical materials varied among historians—and consequently historical sources remained inconsistent—constituted one reason．Therefore，I wished readers to know beforehand that what followed amounted merely to my personal interpretation．Nevertheless，I was confident enough to present this framework both within academic circles and publicly．

I. Circumstances of National Unification in Ancient Times

The nation of Japan was formed by a single ethnic group that may be termed the Japanese people.
The Japanese ethnic group does not have closely related ethnic groups in its vicinity.
The Japanese ethnic group is racially distinct from the Shina (China) ethnic group on the continent.
They also differ from the ethnic groups of Korea, Manchuria, and Mongolia; this can be discerned from their physique, language, and way of life.
However, it has also been speculated that among the Korean ethnic group at the southern tip of the peninsula, there may have been some who intermarried with the Japanese ethnic group.
In maritime regions, a branch of the same ethnic group likely occupied most of Ryukyu, but they were not ethnically identical to the peoples of Taiwan and the islands further south.
It goes without saying that in the northeastern part of the mainland, there existed the Ainu (Emishi), an entirely different race.

As for the original homeland of the Japanese ethnic group, the route by which they migrated, and the period of their migration, based on what had been studied thus far, none of these were known at all. Judging from their living conditions and cultural patterns, it could be inferred that their original homeland was likely in southern regions rather than the northern part of the continent; however, the exact location remained unknowable, and their migration route was not necessarily limited to sea passages as was often speculated. As for the period, it could only be described as having been in the distant past. Whether in their original homeland, during their migration, or from the time they arrived on these islands, they might have incorporated various other ethnic groups to some extent or intermingled with them; however, this was not sufficient to cause them to lose their ethnic unity, and having lived as a single ethnic group since the distant past, the Japanese ethnic group had not been formed through the blending of many peoples. When they arrived on these islands, there might have been some number of indigenous inhabitants of differing ethnicities; however, these groups did not appear to have persisted as one or multiple distinct ethnic forces for long thereafter, having likely been assimilated and absorbed into the Japanese ethnic group over time.

That the existence of this Japanese ethnic group became clearly known to the world and acquired global significance can be discerned today as having occurred in the first or second century BCE—the era of the Former Han dynasty in China.
This marked the beginning of the Historical Period for the Japanese ethnic group.
How long this ethnic group’s Prehistoric Period persisted on these islands prior to that remains unknown, but it can be surmised that it spanned long, long years.

The living conditions of the Japanese ethnic group during the Prehistoric Period can be roughly imagined in its final phase by extrapolating backward from the early Historical Period, beyond what is revealed by prehistoric archaeology. Their primary livelihood was agriculture, but as they had already inhabited these islands for a considerable time, family structures based on small unions of parents, children, and spouses became established; stable villages took shape; and numerous small states encompassing many such villages came into existence. Consequently, politically, the Japanese ethnic group became divided into many small states. The monarchs of these small states appear to have held both political power and religious authority, as various forms of sorcery and rituals venerating deities—manifestations of primitive religious sentiment—were conducted by them for their subordinate populace, constituting one aspect of governance. In some regions, there appear to have been cases where a monarch, while being one of these small states, stood above several other nearby small states and governed them. The authority of the monarch likely involved levying taxes from the populace or conscripting them for labor, but in small states, it is conjectured that the monarch may have largely possessed qualities akin to those of a landlord; consequently, while being a political authority figure, the monarch may have also occupied a position akin to a chieftain or leader of the subordinate populace. As a custom inherent to the very nature of agriculture, it would be evident that arable land was privately owned by several individuals. The Japanese ethnic group left no traces of engaging in pastoralism, but fishing and hunting were practiced everywhere, and maritime traffic was actively conducted by coastal inhabitants. However, even those who made their livelihoods through such means remained part of the Japanese ethnic group, and their adaptation to local living conditions demonstrates that considerable time had passed since their migration to these islands. That stone tools were used goes without saying.

The fact that the existence of the Japanese ethnic group came to hold global significance began when members belonging to several small states located in what is now northwestern Kyushu advanced by sea along the southwestern part of the peninsula to its northwestern regions and made contact with Chinese people who had been expanding into that area at the time.
There they obtained from the Chinese people various artifacts such as silk and bronze ware along with diverse knowledge, thereby creating opportunities to learn Chinese culture and technology which began opening new vistas in the life of the Japanese ethnic group.
The production and use of bronzeware likely began around the end of the first century BCE, and for a considerable period thereafter what is called the metal-and-stone age continued. In any case, rulers of local small states that adopted Chinese cultural artifacts were thereby able to augment both their authority and wealth.
This contact between the small states of Kyushu and the Chinese people continued steadily throughout the first and second centuries CE. Over time their relationship gradually grew closer—as craft goods and knowledge obtained from the Chinese increased in both quantity and variety, so too did their desire to acquire these things intensify. Consequently, monarchs dispatching ships for this purpose multiplied.
The use of iron tools and techniques for their production also began being acquired during this period.
However upon reaching the third century, as cultural relations deepened further and their interactions gained political significance, monarchs emerged who sought to leverage China's political power in the peninsula—either approaching neighboring small-state rulers or intimidating hostile ones—exemplified by Himiko, recorded historically as queen of Yamato (Yamatai, likely present-day Yamato District in Chikugo).
At that time this Yamato monarch appears to have extended authority over nearly all small states in northern Kyushu.

The Chinese craft goods, techniques for their production, and various other knowledge obtained by monarchs of the Kyushu region were transmitted via the Seto Inland Sea routes to what later came to be called the Kinki region from an early period. By the first and second centuries CE, a cultural center had taken shape in that area, and it is conceivable that this development was accompanied by the existence of a political power that controlled the region.
Through examination from various perspectives, it has become largely discernible that this political force was one with the Imperial Ancestors as its monarch, and Yamato likely served as its center.
The exact time of its emergence, the means by which it was established, the extent of its territorial influence, and the pathways through which it amassed such power—none of these are known with certainty. However, judging from later developments, it appears to have existed as a significant force by around the second century.
The southwestern part of that region at minimum included what is now the coastal area of Ōsaka Bay and must have had the logistical advantage of maritime access to distant Kyūshū via Seto Inland Sea routes; however, how far it extended northeastward remains difficult to ascertain.
It cannot be assumed that this entire region existed as direct territory from the outset. Rather, a plausible course of development would be that after several small states had formed there, the monarch of the Yamato region—namely the Imperial Ancestors—who had originally been one such local ruler among others, gradually subjugated these states to establish suzerainty over them, came to govern them, and later incorporated these various small states as direct territories.

By the third century, its territory gradually expanded—encompassing the coastal regions of the Seto Inland Sea to the west and extending its sphere of influence deep into the Tohoku region to the northeast—as can be surmised—though this expansion too may have followed a similar course of development.
However, no concrete details about these circumstances have been recorded.
Yet in the Izumo region there existed a fairly dominant political force that appears to have maintained a resistant stance against Yamato-centered authority over an extended period.

Now, the formation of this political force centered on Yamato—which later encompassed the Kinki region—is considered attributable firstly to its ability to cultivate strength through utilizing new cultural artifacts transmitted from the west, but was also due in no small part to the personal capabilities of its monarch at that time. For in any nation, it is the general state of affairs that there exists a monarch who may be called its founding figure for its power to grow strong. The occupation of a geographically advantageous position encompassing Yamato—a strategically vital area—the fertile and resource-rich Yodogawa (Yodo River) plain, and the coastal region of Osaka, a key maritime hub, formed the foundation for subsequent expansion of power. As this power grew, so too did the monarch’s ambitions; as these ambitions were gradually realized, leading to further consolidation of strength, it can be surmised that a dynamic emerged wherein the rulers of numerous small states were progressively compelled into submission under this mounting pressure.

However, in the third century, they appear to have succeeded in subjugating Izumo's forces but had not yet been able to advance into Kyushu.
This was because there existed a powerful Yamato (Yamatai) state in that region which governed various small states in northern Kyushu by leveraging Shina's political influence on the peninsula.
However, shortly after entering the fourth century, when nomadic tribes' activities in northeastern Asia overthrew Shina's political power in that region—and subsequently on the peninsula—the Yamato (Yamatai) monarch was left without support.
The Yamato (Yamato) forces from the east appear to have seized this opportunity to advance into Kyushu, subjugating both the small states in its northern half and the Yamato (Yamatai) state that had held authority over them.
This occurred in the first half of the fourth century.
The next development came when Yamato (Yamato) court forces advanced into the peninsula during the latter half of that century, creating new circumstances for both our nation and Korea.
Through this peninsula connection, Chinese cultural artifacts adopted by the Yamato court further strengthened imperial authority, thereby accelerating Japan's unification as a single nation.
However, it appears that complete subjugation of southern Kyushu's small states—the so-called Kumaso region—was only achieved after entering the fifth century.
While details remain unclear regarding northeastern states' submission to Yamato rule, by the time southern Kyushu submitted in the southwest, all Japanese ethnic settlements had likely fallen under Yamato's domain.
That is, roughly spanning from present-day Kantō (関東) through Shinano (信濃) to central Echigo (越後).

If the circumstances under which the Yamato state—revering the Imperial Ancestors as its sovereign—unified the Japanese ethnic group were indeed as outlined above, it naturally follows that there was no singular, definitive event of Japan’s founding—as commonly conceived—occurring at a specific time or year.
One might perhaps posit that Japan’s founding period could be defined by the Imperial Household as the time when the Imperial Ancestors first became monarchs of a small state in Yamato; however, not only is that period fundamentally unknowable, but interpreting Japan’s founding in such terms does not seem valid.
If we were to define the founding as the time when the entire Japanese ethnic group was unified into a single state, even if one could estimate its approximate period, the precise details would still remain unknown; moreover, it would not be appropriate to designate this as the founding.
Since the Japanese state was formed through a long historical process, it would be correct to assert that there is no specific time that should be called its founding.
In short, the imperial household’s beginning and the founding of the nation are separate matters.
That the origin of the Japanese ethnic group is entirely unrelated to either of these two matters goes without saying.

In antiquity, based on what are called the Age of the Gods narratives, it was thought that the Imperial Household had possessed all of Japan’s territory from its very inception, and the beginning of the Imperial Household was perceived as synonymous with the founding of the nation in the sense of territorial acquisition over the entire land. More recently, these two concepts—along with a third element, the origin of the Japanese ethnic group on these islands—appear to have become conflated in a rather muddled fashion; this stems from a failure to clarify historical facts about antiquity.

Now, each of the matters discussed here has its basis; however, at present I have merely outlined this process of national founding based on such foundations, refraining from detailing each piece of evidence.
Now, if this historical process approximates factual reality, it would become evident that the tale of Emperor Jimmu’s eastern expedition does not recount historical facts at all.
That is the origin myth of Yamato’s imperial capital.
After the Japanese ethnic group had been unified under the Imperial Household as a single state and a considerable period had elapsed—by which time imperial authority had gradually solidified, in my estimation around the beginning of the sixth century—the court created narratives of the Age of the Gods recounting the Imperial Household’s origins to further consolidate this authority. Since these narratives enshrined the Imperial Ancestors as solar deities dwelling in heaven, they necessitated an account of an Imperial Descendant descending to this land. Moreover, as the site of this descent was designated as Hyuga (日向), it became imperative to connect this location with Yamato, where the imperial capital then stood—and thus this eastern expedition narrative was crafted.
There was an imperial capital in Yamato, but it was unknown when it had come into existence, and how it had come to be established there had been entirely forgotten; thus, this narrative naturally became its origin myth.
The Eastern Expedition is framed as having been accomplished through the sun deity’s protection, but this narrative recounts how the heavenly capital of the sun deity—as Imperial Ancestor—was transferred to earthly Hyuga by the Imperial Grandson who received the “Heavenly Sun Succession,” and how it was then relocated to Yamato by Emperor Jimmu. It was crafted under the ideology that positioned the Imperial Ancestor as the sun deity.
Therefore, it cannot be viewed as a historical fact of the Founding of the Nation.

Furthermore, even the accounts recorded in the *Kojiki* and *Nihon Shoki* regarding subsequent political management—specifically those up to the time of Emperor Chuai—could not be considered records of historical facts.
However, concerning the lineage of successive emperors, those from Emperor Sujin—who is presumed to have reigned around the third century—onward could be regarded as historical figures.
Regarding those prior to this, various interpretations might exist, but regardless of how one views their genealogical existence, such matters should be set aside as extraneous when considering the developmental circumstances of the Yamato state.
It could be imagined that there may have been some form of later transmission regarding a monarch who might be called a founding figure; however, by the end of the fourth century—when what might be considered the first written records concerning the Imperial Household were created—the actual achievements of this founding had already been forgotten, and thus they do not appear at all in the Kojiki or Nihon Shoki.

Now, as for how the Yamato Imperial Household gradually subjugated the monarchs of various small states as described above, their methods likely varied depending on the opponent and circumstances.
There were likely instances where military force was employed.
There were likely instances where the religious authority inherent to the monarch’s position also played a role.
However, it could be inferred that there were few instances of bloody warfare conducted.
Even though the Japanese ethnic group was originally divided into many small states, this does not mean there were constant wars between them, nor did those states exist through military competition.
Agricultural people were by nature peace-loving.
These minor monarchs—who served as leaders and guides of the agricultural people and in a sense resembled large landowners—also required peace for their survival.
Moreover, as there was no contact with foreign ethnic groups that might have instigated frequent warfare—and because all states belonged to the same ethnic group—a warlike, belligerent atmosphere never developed.
The fact that small states generally remained small and no significantly powerful states emerged could be interpreted as indicating there had been few wars that would have created disparities in power and territorial size.
In the Kyushu region, even as that Yamato (Yamatai) allowed the many small states in its vicinity to continue existing while extending its influence over them, this did not appear to have been the attitude of a victorious nation.
The fact that castle construction had not been carried out in Japan even until considerably later should also be considered regarding this matter.
The fact that the Imperial Household succeeded in subjugating the monarchs of numerous small states occurred under these general conditions; given that the Imperial Household had originally been one of those many small-state ruling houses, it stood to reason that its power developed with relatively little reliance on warfare.
The fact that many regional clans existing after national unification—such as Provincial Governors and District Chiefs—appeared to have maintained their pre-unification status as minor monarchs, coupled with the fact that no military installations like fortresses had been established at the imperial palace even in later periods, also supported this inference.
The imperial demesne and territories of Yamato court officials were indeed scattered among those of regional clans; while some of these might have been established following the demise of former small states, even assuming this to be true, it remained unclear how exactly those states had perished.

Judging by the attitudes of provincial governors and others following unification, it could be surmised that as the Yamato court’s influence grew, many monarchs of small states voluntarily chose to submit to preserve their positions and territories.
They were too weak to attempt armed resistance, possessed little experience in waging wars against neighboring states, and—though divided into numerous small states—shared a common history as part of the same Japanese ethnic group with identical language, religion, customs, and practices. Thus, even when confronted by a formidable new political force looming over them, they likely felt an inherent affinity toward it from the outset.
Moreover, if some small states within the same region—as seen in the aforementioned Kyushu example—had previously subordinated themselves to a dominant local power among them, submitting to the Imperial Household would have merely replaced that dominant power with a greater authority: the Imperial Household itself. One could infer that such transitions likely proceeded relatively smoothly.
From the imperial court’s perspective, while military force might have been employed in certain cases and general intimidation applied through various means, would it not be accurate to conclude that this described state of affairs represented the prevailing situation?

The circumstances of national unification may be understood as described above; however, the Yamato court engaged not with the populace but with the monarchs of various small states.
The unification process was achieved through subjugating these monarchs rather than directly involving the populace.
Needless to say, military conquest of the populace did not occur.
From the people’s perspective, what is termed national unification amounted merely to indirect subjugation under the Yamato court that now stood above their former monarchs.
Beyond residents of territories directly controlled by the Imperial Household, no direct ties emerged with the imperial institution.
Needless to add—regarding both populace subjugated in this manner and regional clans like Provincial Governors—none could have shared blood relations with the Imperial Household; consequently, Japan’s state structure cannot be viewed as an extended imperial family system.

II. The Historical Circumstances Behind the Emergence and Development of the Concept of an Unbroken Imperial Line

While it remains unknown how many years passed before the Imperial Household—based in Yamato—unified the entire Japanese ethnic group to become their sovereign, if we accept the earlier consideration that the existence of a Yamato state can be roughly inferred from around the second century CE, then approximately two hundred years elapsed until the subjugation of northern Kyushu at the beginning of the fourth century, and approximately three hundred years until what is considered the period of Japan’s full territorial unification at the beginning of the fifth century.
Given both this span of time and the unceasing expansion of power during that period, these factors proved sufficient to solidify the Imperial Household’s position; by fifth-century Japan, it had already become something unshakable.
No one rebelled against it, nor did anyone attempt to seize that position.
And it must be considered that there were various circumstances supporting this.

The first reason was that the Imperial Household did not come from outside the Japanese ethnic group to conquer it and thereby obtain their position and power as sovereigns; rather, having emerged from within the ethnic group and gradually subjugated the surrounding small states—combined with the circumstances of these states’ submission as previously outlined—it followed naturally that no rebellious attitudes toward the Imperial Household arose.
Had resistance emerged under special circumstances, it would likely have come from descendants of small-state monarchs who had lost their independent status and authority; but such individuals lacked the strength for effective resistance and could secure neither sympathy nor assistance from others in similar positions.
This becomes evident when observing how the Izumo Provincial Governor—apparently the most powerful among these monarchs’ descendants—remained fully content with his provincial governor status under the Imperial Household.
Ordinary Provincial Governors and District Chiefs sought to stabilize their positions by aligning themselves closely with the Imperial Household and leveraging its authority as backing.
The Imperial Household never employed military force against regional clans, nor were there any signs of domestic battles having occurred.
In this sense, ancient Japan maintained remarkable peacefulness—a condition rooted in the fundamental reality that the Japanese ethnic group constituted a single people.

Moreover, because the Imperial Household’s governance targeted regional clans rather than the general populace directly, there were no circumstances that would lead the populace to attempt rebellion against the Imperial Household.
Outside of the few directly administered imperial territories, the populace’s immediate rulers were regional clans serving as Provincial Governors (and court officials holding positions in the imperial court). Since both tax payments and labor services were rendered to these rulers, even when hardships arose in their lives, the people did not attribute such responsibilities to the Imperial Household.
And it may be surmised that the populace of the imperial demesne took a certain pride in being under direct imperial administration.

The second reason was the absence of wars with foreign ethnic groups.
In wars against neighboring foreign states or ethnic groups, it was customary for the monarch themselves to lead the military forces; in such cases, victory saw that monarch extolled as a national hero—thereby strengthening their authority—whereas defeat conversely diminished their popularity and weakened their power, potentially leading to loss of their position as sovereign depending on prevailing circumstances.
Even when a war was won through a general’s capabilities rather than the monarch’s own power, public acclaim tended to shift to that general, who might ultimately ascend to the throne.
In short, wars with foreign ethnic groups destabilized the monarch’s position and created opportunities for dynastic overthrow within their lineage.
However, because the Japanese ethnic group inhabited an island nation, they had no contact with foreign ethnic groups other than the Ainu in the northeastern part of the same island. Moreover, during the period from the fourth to sixth centuries under circumstances of ethnic fragmentation on the Korean Peninsula and adjacent mainland, none among those groups crossed the sea to launch an invasion against this country.
Because of this, wars as clashes of ethnic forces did not occur, and consequently no circumstances arose that would destabilize the monarch’s position as described.

However, as part of the Imperial Court’s duties, a military advance toward the Korean Peninsula was conducted as described above (likely to protect small states associated with Japanese people at the peninsula’s southern tip); though this involved wars with victories and defeats, these were not clashes of ethnic forces to begin with, and since in these conflicts they merely dispatched generals, neither outcome—whether victory or defeat—exerted any influence whatsoever on the Imperial Household’s position.
(The expedition by Empress of Emperor Chuai is not a fact but a narrative construct.) And the acquisition of Chinese cultural artifacts by the imperial court and its surrounding entities—resulting from this advance into the peninsula—served to enhance the Imperial Household’s status from a cultural perspective.
While there existed conflicts with the Ainu in the northeast as competing ethnic forces, these appear to have been largely left to the actions of residents in adjacent regions, with minimal involvement from the imperial court. As the Japanese ethnic group gradually advanced into Ainu territories as the dominant power in broad terms, this too ultimately had no impact on the Imperial Household's authority.
This stands as one fact behind the gradual solidification of the Imperial Household’s status.

The third [reason] was that ancient Japan lacked substantive governance befitting a state or monarchic undertakings worthy of the name—a circumstance from which various consequences arose.
That emperors themselves did not personally oversee political administration constituted one such factor; equally significant was the absence of any instances of imperial misgovernance or failed state initiatives.
Examining patterns across numerous ethnic groups reveals warfare typically served as early monarchs’ primary occupation during culturally formative periods—a reality generating ancillary governance structures; yet within our nation’s conflict-free domestic sphere, one might assert genuine statecraft scarcely existed.
Consequently few matters necessitated direct imperial intervention.
While administrative affairs certainly existed, these fell under purview of court-affiliated clan officials.
The paramount event spanning late fourth through fifth centuries involved peninsular management—a military-intensive endeavor wherein martial clans like Ōtomo and Mononobe likely assumed pivotal roles.
Given their operational theater lay overseas beyond immediate homeland oversight,
even critical state matters transcending routine court administration ultimately devolved upon these clan officials’ competence—their families consequently accruing inherent authority until they became de facto senior statesmen of the imperial court.

When such conditions persisted over time, even when significant domestic incidents occurred that required handling, the Emperor himself would not take charge of the situation; instead, senior court vassals came to collectively deliberate and manage crucial state affairs.
Therefore, the Emperor could neither commit misgovernment nor experience failed undertakings.
On one hand, this established the custom whereby senior court vassals continued to take charge of such affairs even as time progressed and state affairs requiring governance multiplied; on the other hand, it signified that all political responsibility would henceforth fall entirely upon them.
Needless to say, while politics were indeed conducted in the Emperor’s name, this was because everyone knew that in reality, those politics were carried out by senior vassals.
And this state of affairs naturally served to stabilize the Imperial Household’s position.

Fourth, it can be considered that the Emperor held religious duties and authority.
The Emperor did not demonstrate his authority and power through military force, nor did he appear to engage in practical governance; however, there existed another form of power through which his presence was made manifest.
It was, on one hand, a religious duty and, on the other hand, a position of cultural standing.
The fact that political monarchs held religious positions may be considered a continuation of extremely ancient primitive customs; however, their religious role consisted of performing various magical rites and divine rituals for the people—and through such activities, just as shamans who conduct magic and mediate between deities and humans might themselves be perceived as divine, there were cases where monarchs too came to be regarded as gods.
While the distant origins and historical basis for the Emperor being called “Manifest Deity” may lie here, in reality—within the ideological framework of eras known to us today—this appellation was used solely to signify that his position as political sovereign carried a religious dimension. That is to say, it denoted that governing the state was conceptually or nominally work performed in a divine capacity. Thus, “Manifest Deity” served as a title for his status precisely as one who ruled the state—in other words, as political sovereign.
While his essence remained fundamentally that of a political sovereign, this historically derived appellation was employed to signify that status.

This neither means that the Emperor governed in place of a deity transcending himself, nor that imperial rule was exercised through such divine authority; nor does it imply that the Emperor was considered a god distinct from ordinary people, imbued with mystical significance in any sense.
It goes without saying that the Emperor was not enshrined as an object of religious worship.
In ancient Japan, one may consider that no such practice as emperor worship existed.
In daily life, the Emperor comported himself as an ordinary person—a fact plainly witnessed, heard, and understood by all.
This clarity is further evidenced by narratives in the Kojiki and Nihon Shoki depicting imperial romantic affairs or encounters with maidens along roadways.
Even expressions like “Manifest Deity,” while present in intellectual discourse and employed in solemn state rituals, appear not to have been commonly used among ordinary people.
The adoption of “Tennō”—a title denoting China’s Heavenly Emperor—as an imperial designation likely began around the late sixth century and may have connected to “Manifest Deity” concepts, though its broad public recognition remains doubtful.
More significantly, what all people knew of the Emperor’s religious role involved performing state functions like Great Purification rites and conducting various deity rituals—actions demonstrating through his worship of gods that he remained fundamentally human in relation to divinity.
For people whose daily existence was governed by such magic and rituals, the Emperor’s position demanded reverence and gratitude while simultaneously embodying spiritual authority.
None dared profane this authority.
As these ritual functions constituted one aspect of imperial governance, this reality explains why the Nakatomi clan—administrators of such affairs—rose to power as senior court officials.

Fifth could be considered the cultural position of the Imperial Household.
The Chinese cultural artifacts that entered via the peninsula were primarily utilized by the imperial court and its surrounding ruling class; thus needless to say, the Imperial Household made greatest use of them.
This consequently led to many new Tomo no Tsukuri families emerging within the imperial court.
These families sustained themselves by managing affairs related to newly introduced cultural artifacts for the Imperial Household, thereby gaining status.
Moreover generally speaking, the Imperial Household naturally assumed a leadership position within this new culture.
That this development enhanced the Household's significance would have been self-evident.
Unlike demonstrations of military force, this fostered both reverence and approachability—prompting people to seek proximity to the Imperial Household and partake in its cultural benefits.

To summarize concisely the five points analyzed above: in practical terms, the Imperial Household stood as both an approachable and venerable presence for court officials and regional clans; through their affiliation with it, they preserved their livelihoods and status while fulfilling their associated desires.
Moreover, it should be considered that their actions toward the peninsula appear to have evoked a certain ethnic sentiment among them as well, fostering an attitude of viewing the Imperial Household as a symbol of that sentiment.
That affection and reverence toward the Imperial Household were cultivated through this would naturally become evident.

Now, aided by various circumstances of this nature, the Imperial Household had endured long as the Imperial Household; once it had persisted this long, the very fact of its continuity came to be perceived as its essential nature, leading people to conceive that the Imperial Household ought inherently to endure perpetually.
The fact that the Imperial Household had existed since the distant past and that its origins had become obscured also led people to perceive its existence as something natural—or rather, to regard the Imperial Household itself as a natural entity.
(When there existed facts of royal houses being frequently overthrown, it gave rise to the notion that royal houses ought to be replaced.) Consequently, from this emerged the desire to perpetuate the Imperial Household far into the future.
When this desire intensified, the notion that it must be perpetuated—that it must be ensured to endure—came to be felt as a moral obligation.
If some situation were to arise (for example, even if it were something like the direct imperial line being severed), stimulated by this, this desire would be further intensified, and this sense of obligation would be further solidified.
The early sixth century appears to have been a period when such desires were intensifying among senior vassals of the Imperial Household and other powerholders holding positions at the court; the Age of the Gods narratives transmitted today through the Kojiki and Nihon Shoki were rooted in works created for this very purpose.

The Age of the Gods narratives sought to expound upon the origins of the Imperial Household through storytelling; their central concepts lay in establishing the Imperial Household’s ancestors as solar deities imbued with religious significance—from whom the imperial throne (Ama-tsu-hi-tsugi) was said to descend—while encompassing both the notion that the Emperor’s position as political sovereign carried a religious dimension and the ideal of perpetual imperial succession.
Moreover, these narratives established that the Imperial Household ruled the entire nation from its inception, yet they did not portray the Imperial ancestors as ethnic heroes of the Japanese people against foreign tribes; instead, they remained unwaveringly depicted as monarchs governing the Japanese state—though their political governance and monarchic undertakings scarcely appeared in the narratives.
And it was established that crucial state affairs were conducted through the collective deliberation of the gods who were ancestors of the court’s Tomo no Tsukuri.
The figures appearing in the narratives were either ancestors of those Tomo no Tsukuri or those of regional clans, with not the slightest trace of the people’s labors visible within them.
Work involving the populace was also not narrated.
It was said that malevolent deities and evil spirits were purged in a religious sense; however, stories involving the use of military force were absent from the narratives as initially created. While traces of such could be seen in the later-added tale of the Izumo pacification—believed to be a subsequent addition—even this account strongly reflected a spirit of compromise and peace. Thus throughout all the Age of the Gods narratives, there were no tales of bloody warfare.
Although similarly appended later, even the tale of Susanoo no Mikoto crossing to the peninsula was not framed as a military subjugation; likewise, Sukunahikona no Mikoto’s arrival from beyond the sea to aid in nation-building was not narrated as a martial campaign. These accounts could thus be interpreted as having been ascribed cultural significance.
Moreover, clear traces had emerged of the court’s Tomo no Tsukuri and regional clans creating genealogies to present their families as descendants of the Imperial Household while seeking to demonstrate their houses’ existence through affiliation with the Imperial Household.

Thus, it may be said that all the various circumstances considered to characterize the state of affairs in the fourth and fifth centuries as discussed above were reflected in the Age of the Gods narratives.
Through these Age of the Gods narratives, the desires and sense of responsibility of those who held power in the imperial court at that time and in subsequent eras—to perpetuate the Imperial Household eternally as the Imperial Household and to ensure it must be perpetuated—were expressed.
And its foundation lay in the fact that the imperial throne had already endured for so long by this period.
Precisely because such a fact existed did the ideology seeking to perpetuate it eternally arise.
Regarding the Age of the Gods narratives, one must recognize that their significance lay not in the stories themselves but in the ideology of the ruling class that produced them, and that even greater meaning resided in the historical political-social conditions that gave rise to such ideology.

The ideology that the imperial throne must be eternal—nay, must remain eternal—was historically nurtured and solidified in this manner; however, this ideology would only grow increasingly stronger henceforth.
Even as eras changed and circumstances shifted, the principal factors among the various conditions enumerated above remained largely consistent when broadly considered.
Even after the sixth century, since Emperors did not personally assume charge of political affairs, instances of so-called direct imperial rule should be regarded as exceedingly rare exceptions.
Though the Taika Reforms and the Ritsuryō system that completed them established a framework for direct imperial rule, this system did not constitute actual direct governance when implemented.
In reality, political power resided with entities ranging from the pre-reform Soga clan to later houses like Fujiwara, Taira, Minamoto, Ashikaga, Toyotomi, and Tokugawa—even what is termed cloistered government did not constitute direct imperial rule.
The forms of governance varied across periods: at times utilizing court institutions through positions like Sesshō and Kampaku within the imperial court; at others establishing separate shogunate structures outside the court to issue decrees. Though those holding power differed in status—being civil officials or military figures—they all shared the common feature of not constituting direct imperial rule.
The influence of these powerful houses proved transient, shifting successively from one to another—a phenomenon arising because each house eventually committed misgovernance rendering it unable to maintain power, thereby demonstrating how responsibility for national administration naturally devolved upon these houses.
In this sense, Emperors remained in positions devoid of political responsibility—a natural consequence of actual governance being conducted by others.
The Emperor inherently "does not commit evil"
and thus remained in such a position.
Herein lies one reason why the Imperial Household endured as the Imperial Household.

However, the Imperial Household’s endurance did not stem solely from such passive reasons.
No matter how much influence powerful families gained, they remained content with their position as influential houses under the Imperial Household and never took a single step beyond it.
Because there existed the spiritual authority of the Imperial Household, that authority was never lost under any circumstances; no one doubted it, nor did they attempt to undermine it.
This is an evident fact; however, the very existence of such facts serves to demonstrate that the Imperial Household indeed possessed spiritual authority. Furthermore, this authority arose from the establishment of the imperial throne’s permanence through the circumstances previously described.

At the same time, the Imperial Household adapted to the political framework of regents during eras when authority resided with regent houses and remained within the political framework of shogunates during periods when they were established; consequently, this very adaptability naturally became one crucial reason why this spiritual authority was preserved.
The regent governments arose because there were circumstances necessitating their emergence, and shogunate politics were implemented because there were reasons requiring their adoption—both developments signifying shifts in the zeitgeist. Particularly significant was how warriors—initially non-legitimate entities—arose among the populace, gained influence, became legitimized through establishing shogunate governance, and saw those shogunates seize de facto control of state affairs. Furthermore, as shogunate leaders rose and fell based on the allegiance of numerous warriors, and as those same warriors gradually shaped a feudal system, this demonstrated—in one respect—that both the impetus and authority driving politics had progressively shifted to the populace and regions. Coupled with the cultural center’s departure from the imperial court, these constituted profoundly significant developments in Japanese ethnic history and marked a major transformation of the era. Yet despite this, the Imperial Household refrained from forcibly suppressing or adopting oppositional stances toward these historical currents.
The Imperial Household’s position became naturally stabilized by allowing historical currents to follow their course; yet this ability to confidently entrust itself to those shifts existed because the Imperial Household possessed an unassailable spiritual authority and because it itself remained convinced of its position’s stability.
Admittedly, there were indeed rare instances where the Imperial Household restrained the Fujiwara clan’s influence or undertook attempts to overthrow the shogunate, as seen during the Jōkyū (承久) and Kenmu (建武) periods. However, such attempts neither represented a unified stance across the entire Imperial Household nor were they repeated endeavors. Moreover, actions specifically targeting the shogunate relied on warrior power, meaning that even in this regard, they ultimately aligned with shifting historical currents.
(Those who go against and attempt to stem the tide of historical currents will fail.)
If failures accumulate, their existence becomes endangered.
(After Kenmu, no further attempts akin to the Kenmu Restoration were made.)

Under such age-old circumstances, those who held de facto political power—though their lineages and forms of governance changed—existed under the Imperial Household; and despite this persisting since ancient times without the slightest disruption to the Imperial Household’s existence, a dual governance structure endured, forming in the nation a state structure unparalleled in the world.
In an ordinary nation, had entities akin to the Fujiwara or Tokugawa clans—de facto political sovereigns—maintained their position and power for so long, they would inevitably have fully assumed monarchical status, thereby effecting a dynastic change; yet in Japan, the Imperial Household was upheld as the Imperial Household without exception.
Regarding these de facto sovereigns who might be called actual rulers, it can be considered that the Imperial Household occupied a position of weakness; thus, their adaptation to the currents of the times and political systems of each era was due to this circumstance. Yet one must assert that there lies profound significance in the fact that such a weak entity was consistently revered as the Imperial Household—it is here that the spiritual authority of the Imperial Household was demonstrated.

However, it should be noted that what is termed spiritual authority is not akin to a religious authority divorced from political power.
That is, without exception, the authority of the political ruler of the Japanese state.
It is simply that the Imperial Household did not personally undertake the work of governance themselves; hence when we speak of "spiritual" here, it is in this sense.
In the late Edo period, the view that the shogunate governed under an imperial commission from the Imperial Household came into circulation, and the shogunate itself came to acknowledge this. However, this was merely an ideological interpretation retroactively applied to explain the contemporary fact of the shogunate holding de facto power—yet it might be said that this arrangement found symbolic expression in how the legally defined official positions held by the Tokugawa clan derived from appointments by the Emperor.
One might perhaps call this too merely a formality, but within the performance of such formalities lay manifestations of both the Imperial Household’s intent and the Tokugawa clan’s stance—thus these official positions were not mere symbols of honor.
Now, the fact that the Imperial Household—possessing only such spiritual authority—had endured since antiquity over a long period itself gradually reinforced that very authority, thereby increasingly solidifying the belief that the Imperial Household ought to be eternal. Or rather, it would be more accurate to say that this came to be regarded as an established fact to such an extent that such matters were not consciously recognized.
During the era when the Age of the Gods narratives were created, the permanence of the Imperial Household’s status was an ideology held by those in power at the imperial court; however, due to subsequent historical circumstances as described here, it came to be embraced as an ideology by newly emergent powerholders outside the court and the general samurai class that both formed their foundation and supported them—a development stemming from their attainment of political authority or positions of governance.
Once they attained political status, this necessarily had to be considered.

Now, the authority of the Imperial Household was considered in relation to political powerholders who held de facto governance, not in relation to the populace.
After the land nationalization system established by the Taika Reforms collapsed and powerful families rose to prominence, the Imperial Household had no direct contact with the populace outside those residing on newly established imperial private lands.
Until the so-called Sekkan period, politics was conducted in the Emperor’s name; however, as it was not direct imperial rule, the Imperial Household consequently never directly confronted the populace with authority.
Even in later periods, while there were attempts by certain factions within the Imperial Household—as seen in cases like the Jōkyū and Kenmu eras—to overthrow warrior governments through military force, not once did they ever apply armed oppression against the populace or confront them as enemies to be subdued.
The general populace did not hold deep interest in the Imperial Household; this was in part because it was an era when the people held no political status and lacked knowledge about it.

However, although they did not hold political status, intellectuals who possessed knowledge held perceptions of the Imperial Household corresponding to their respective fields of knowledge.
Those with Confucian knowledge did so through that knowledge, and those with Buddhist knowledge did so through that knowledge as well.
And in all such cases, they allowed no doubt regarding the necessity of the Imperial Household’s permanence.
In terms of Confucian political thought, despite being obliged to affirm the replacement of royal houses, with the exception of a very few cases, they did not attempt to apply that ideology to the Imperial Household.
This was not only because the unbroken lineage of the Imperial Household stood as an incontrovertible ancient fact, but also because culture had broadly disseminated, forming an intellectual class outside the power structure—and because those intellectuals came to take interest in politics.
Buddhist institutions, both because their deep ties to the ruling class had inherited ideological tendencies from it and because their doctrines possessed adaptable aspects compatible with any ideology, likewise acknowledged this fact and endeavored to support it.

However, certain differences arose between the era when the Age of the Gods narratives were created and later periods. One such difference was that appellations like "Manifest Deity" fell into disuse; even when employed ceremonially or conventionally, they lost their sense of tangible reality.
Though the august title "Emperor" continued to be used, its original significance faded from memory.
While Emperors maintained their performance of divine rituals unchanged, they equally conducted Buddhist ceremonies.
Meanwhile, the Department of Divinities—established under the Ritsuryō system as the Emperor's ritual institution—gradually vanished without notice over time.
The religious character of the Emperor's position had become imperceptible.
This transformation resulted from cultural progress and political circumstances.
In its place emerged the Confucian-derived concept of the sage emperor being applied to the throne.
Though this notion already appeared in the Kojiki and Nihon Shoki, later periods saw it emphasized as the Emperor's personal cultivation of sovereign virtue.
The paramount principle held that monarchs should implement benevolent governance and show compassion toward their subjects.
While this Confucian ideal remained unrealized politically without direct imperial rule—and would have proven difficult to achieve even under personal governance, given Confucian political ethics' nature—it held significance in premodern political systems fundamentally different from modern states premised on popular self-determination. That successive Emperors contemplated showing benevolence toward the populace—albeit only theoretically—and that this gradually became enshrined as the Imperial Household's traditional spirit carries profound weight.
That these moral precepts were adopted verbatim from Confucian classics as guides for cultivating sovereign virtue stemmed precisely from Emperors not personally conducting governance.
For had they governed directly, they would inevitably have focused chiefly on more pragmatic concerns.

Next, it could be considered that the ancient state of affairs—where the Imperial Household served as the wellspring of culture—persisted until the medieval period but subsequently underwent gradual transformation: the cultural center shifted to warriors and temples, ultimately returning entirely to the populace.
The people’s lives transformed and culture advanced, but the Imperial Household continued to maintain its existence within the vestiges of an old culture that had lost its vitality.
In this manner, the Imperial Household remained in a position removed from actual politics while also becoming distanced from the people’s lives in cultural aspects.
Even so, the vestiges of old culture lingering around the Imperial Household—its faded echoes—became objects of antiquarian reverence among intellectuals. Corresponding to how the Imperial Household now stood aloft on high, far removed from ordinary lives, people felt a peculiar yearning toward it. Furthermore, sympathy induced by its perceived weakness in political power dynamics—positioned as it was against those holding real authority—combined with a sentimental melancholy born from the sense that everything about the court had diminished compared to antiquity. These elements converged to foster among intellectuals a tendency to regard the Imperial Household through a lens of poetic sentiment.
And thus, this came to form one facet of the people’s perception of the Imperial Household.

In this way, while some circumstances from the era when the Age of the Gods narratives were created later disappeared, new circumstances arose in their place—which in turn naturally functioned to strengthen belief in the Imperial Household’s permanence.

However, by the mid-nineteenth century, global circumstances no longer permitted Japan to maintain its dual governance structure.
For Japan to stand as one of the nations of the world, it became clear that the government had to be either the Imperial Court or the Shogunate—one or the other.
The Meiji Restoration was thus carried out.
This Restoration was neither an ideological revolution nor a social reform, but rather signified the seizure of authority from the shogun—who as head of the shogunate had been conducting actual governance—and its transfer to the Emperor; in other words, it aimed to establish a system of direct imperial rule. It was, through and through, a reform of political institutions.
In this sense, it should be called a return to the Taika Reforms and the Ritsuryō system that completed them.
However, as this momentum progressed—leading to the abolition of the feudal system and subsequently the samurai system—the significance of social reform came to newly accompany these changes; yet even this was ultimately rooted in political necessity.
The adoption of European culture and ideas was not a new undertaking of the Meiji Restoration, as it inherited the shogunate’s institutions and policies.
Within the very forces that drove events as far as the Restoration lay, paradoxically, an obstinate conservative ideology.

Now that the shogunate had vanished and feudal lords and samurai lost their privileged statuses—with all samurai and commoners merging into a single nation—from this point onward, the Imperial Household came to directly face this general populace, and for the first time, the people became cognizant of the Imperial Household’s existence within actual governance.

Moreover, as European culture and institutions were newly adopted even within the Imperial Court, the cultural gap between it and the lives of the populace—who now shared this common condition—was effectively eliminated.

This naturally presented an ideal opportunity for closer interaction between the Imperial Household and the people. Indeed, early in the Meiji era, there were visible signs of movement in this direction. Furthermore, even as the system of direct imperial rule was affirmed, the vigorous emergence of demands for government by public opinion and deliberative politics could also be interpreted as embodying this very significance.

Though they sought to emulate institutions developed in Europe, within the discourse on establishing a popularly elected assembly existed the concept that a constitutional government would—by making governance the people’s own responsibility—simultaneously place the Emperor in a secure position free from political accountability, thereby ensuring the permanence of the imperial throne and perfecting what is termed the Unbroken Imperial Line.

However, the so-called domain cliques that actually held sway over politics adopted an opposing stance toward this ideological tendency and allied themselves with the rigidly conservative ideologies existing in the court and other quarters. They sought to demonstrate the Imperial Household’s dignity by placing it in an elevated position isolated from the populace. Simultaneously, grounding their actions in an ideology—which, while having roots in Chinese thought, should at that time be regarded as something imported from Europe—that posited rulers and the people as opposing entities, they concluded that strengthening the Emperor’s authority over the people while suppressing their political agency as much as possible would solidify the Imperial Household’s position.
The constitution was enacted under such circumstances.
And alongside this, a bureaucratic system, likewise modeled after a European nation, was established, and administrative real authority gradually began shifting to those bureaucrats.
Furthermore, the military authority that had been seized from the shogunate and feudal lords through the Meiji Restoration occupied a position of superiority within general administrative affairs.
Due to these various circumstances, the Imperial Household became enclosed within a complex and austere ceremonial atmosphere, thereby being positioned at a certain distance from the populace, who were thus led to submit to its power and dignity rather than harbor affectionate sentiments toward it.
The benevolence of the Imperial Household was constantly preached; however, this concept—rooted in Confucian thought—does not align with the ethos of the modern state and national life, as discussed above.
And in parallel with this, as an essential subject in school education, the dignity of the national polity that reveres the Imperial Household of the Unbroken Line was taught.
The general populace, at any rate, came to know through this that the Imperial Household was of a single lineage and to believe in the permanence of the imperial throne; however, since this education was conducted primarily by presenting the Age of the Gods narratives as historical fact, it contained many elements incompatible with modern intellectual sensibilities.
The attempt to impose upon the relationship between the Imperial Household and the people a moral ideology between ruler and subject—formulated during the feudal era and expressed through Confucian ethical terminology—was likewise the work of these policymakers. In another sphere, they even came to implement rituals in schools that bore a quasi-religious character resembling emperor worship. Yet all such measures proved incompatible with both the spirit of the modern state and contemporary intellectual sensibilities.

Now, this attitude of policymakers not only led them to err in the constitutional advisory path within actual governance but also frequently brought harm upon the Imperial Household by attributing responsibility to it.
Nevertheless, the Emperor always maintained an affinity toward the people, which manifested in concrete forms on certain occasions. Moreover, the populace—particularly its educated and knowledgeable members—hoped for opportunities to candidly express their affection toward the Imperial Household and never failed to act upon such chances when they arose.
The use of expressions such as "Our Regent His Highness" on certain occasions serves as one example of this.
Thus, while maintaining traditional ideas historically cultivated and solidified over long ages from antiquity, [they] have striven to further clarify and reinforce the Imperial Household’s permanence through preparedness to adapt to global circumstances and modes of thought harmonizing with the modern state’s ethos.

However, with the recent emergence of debates concerning the so-called emperor system, this appeared to indicate that doubts regarding the Imperial Household’s permanence had arisen among a portion of the populace.
This primarily originated from how the military and its affiliated bureaucrats exploited both constitutional provisions and the people’s reverence for the Imperial Household while distorting national history to substantiate their claims. Through these means, they not only insisted that governance should occur under direct imperial rule—or propagated that it already did—but also asserted that the Emperor must wield autocratic monarchical authority or portrayed him as already possessing it, thereby attempting to disguise their arbitrary actions as imperial commands.
After moving to initiate war against America and Britain, the military’s stance intensified further as they ceaselessly propagated through varied rhetoric that every war-related matter stemmed from the Emperor’s will—that all sacrifices of lives and property by the people were made solely for His Majesty’s sake.
Moreover, this propaganda carried an ideology that mystified the Emperor as divine while positing this as embodying national polity—an obstinately archaic mindset incompatible with modern intellect.
Yet when war’s outcome manifested in realities faced by citizens, those unable to discern propaganda’s fictitious nature—that it masked self-serving motives—came to attribute all consequences to the Emperor: defeat itself, accompanying humiliations, national crisis, social chaos, mass civilian deaths, and widespread livelihood hardships.
Considering historical facts showing scarce instances of direct imperial rule since antiquity—and recognizing how imperial permanence concepts developed through this reality—one might say military propaganda shifting war responsibility onto the Emperor followed inevitable logic.
Under these circumstances, certain ideologically inclined individuals extended their doctrines to discuss abolishing the emperor system—a development seemingly aided by intellectual resistance against mystical national polity theories.
Furthermore, as democracy advocacy—now broadly accepted as Japan’s political direction and earnestly pursued by citizens—became entwined with these currents, arguments emerged within such circles that imperial existence fundamentally conflicted with democratic governance.
While abolitionist arguments contained flawed premises and reasoning, preservationist discourse similarly failed to comprehend imperial permanence’s true origins—even contradicting historical facts at points—while evoking suspicion that ideological obstruction of democracy lurked beneath their stance.
If valid, this would imply foundational belief in democracy’s incompatibility with imperial existence persists.
Yet this fundamentally misapprehends both democracy’s nature and imperial essence.

The Japanese Imperial Household arose from within the Japanese ethnic group, unified them, formed the Japanese state, and became its ruler.
In past ideological frameworks, a ruler’s position inherently stood opposed to the populace.
Yet historically, across its long existence, the Imperial Household never once looked down upon the people from lofty heights nor sought to suppress them through force.
This meant that in practical governance, no opposition existed between the Imperial Household and the people.
In modernity however, national politics became understood as the people’s own responsibility to conduct—this being what constitutes democratic political thought.
The harmony between this ideology and the Imperial Household’s position as state ruler emerged not through imperial opposition to the people from without, but through embodying popular will from within—governing with such significance.
From the people’s perspective, thorough implementation of democracy enabled this.
Were the people to preside over all state affairs, the Imperial Household would naturally exist within them as an integral unity.
Concretely speaking, the Imperial Household’s significance lay in serving as both the nucleus of national unity and living symbol of national spirit.
Residing within the people meant sharing their eternity; just as generations continue endlessly through ancestral succession, so too did this shared existence constitute an Unbroken Imperial Line.
Both the circumstances of state formation—emerging from ethnic unity—and the Imperial Household’s historical avoidance of oppositional relations with the populace naturally aligned with this conceptual framework.
Moreover, through adapting its position to successive political forms across history’s changes, the Imperial Household came to embody democratic politics as modern state ethos.
However ancient tribal structures transformed—whether under Ritsuryō legal codes or medieval feudal economies—the Imperial Household had always harmonized with evolving systems and would continue doing so regardless of future social configurations.
Yet because most citizens still failed to internalize this modern state ethos—and consequently could not implement it politically—they proved unable to correct reactionary ideologies, remove despotic policymakers, reform negligent parliaments, or establish proper governance adhering to modern principles. Entrusting power to wayward leaders ultimately plunged the nation into crisis while burdening the Imperial Household—a failure demanding popular accountability.
In this modern age where self-governance rightfully belongs to the people, the Imperial Household becomes theirs collectively—the Emperor being “our Emperor.”
“Our Emperor” must be cherished.
The people’s Imperial Household deserves embrace within their collective heart.
Only through popular affection could this institution—sharing two millennia with the nation—be positioned appropriately for modern statehood: beautified, secured, its permanence assured.
The people love their Imperial Household.
For democracy manifests its fullest realization precisely where such love resides.

The people possess the ability to accomplish any manner of things, and it is precisely in their accomplishing them that the essence of democratic politics resides.
Moreover, loving the Imperial Household in this manner naturally constitutes a grand manifestation of a humanitarian spirit that resonates with the world.