Pathway to Japanese Literature

I. A China Policy Swinging from One Extreme to Another

My discourse on Eastern Peace marks its first appearance in this journal, though this constitutes the third occasion on which I have addressed the matter in total.
The first instance occurred approximately twenty years ago, precisely when indications of China’s partition among the Great Powers manifested following the Sino-Japanese War.
Initially, the Great Powers perceived China as a sleeping lion.
This derived from a speech delivered in Paris by Zeng Jize—then a senior Qing statesman—wherein he analogized his nation to a slumbering lion, asserting that once awakened, China would cease to be its present self and instead unleash the fearsome power of a lion whose roar terrifies all beasts.
At that time, China had been actively adopting Western civilization while pursuing methods to enrich the nation and strengthen its military—organizing Western-style naval and land forces, establishing naval bases such as Dagu Fort, Lüshun, and Weihaiwei, and displaying signs of comprehensive transformation.
Had China maintained this momentum until reaching a state where its future could no longer be disregarded, the very notion of a "sleeping lion" would have profoundly agitated public sentiment among the Great Powers.
Yet when hostilities commenced in the Sino-Japanese War, what outcome emerged from this contest?
Contrary to expectations, China suffered successive defeats across both naval and terrestrial theaters.
At that juncture, Chinese military capabilities surpassed ours in both domains; their navy already possessed two battleships while Japan lacked comparable vessels altogether, our total tonnage being exceedingly modest.
Regarding land forces, they fielded elite units like Li Hongzhang’s Beiyang Army—trained in Western methods and equipped with cutting-edge armaments—while we maintained merely seven divisions that differed markedly from today’s formations in their paltry troop numbers; thus our actual strength proved far inferior to contemporary estimations, our weaponry similarly deficient.
Consequently, Western observers versed in foreign affairs uniformly expressed misgivings about Japan.
[They contended that] while Japanese valor might secure initial victories, ultimate triumph would inevitably belong to China.
Not only those harboring animosity toward Japan but even sympathetic voices shared this apprehension.
Yet what transpired when battle was joined?
China collapsed within barely six months of conflict, whereupon Li Hongzhang found himself dispatched with unseemly haste to Shimonoseki to sue for peace.
This produced the infamous Treaty of Shimonoseki—and precisely at this moment arose the Triple Intervention.

China was a vast nation with an immense population.
Moreover, when examining its historical records through successive dynasties, what had perpetually afflicted China were invariably the northern barbarians.
It was precisely these northern barbarians who ultimately swept across the Central Plains and established the dynastic foundation known as the Aisin-Gioro.
They believed that should this fearsome Tartar tribe undergo proper training and organize a civilized military force, it could assemble armies of unmatched superiority.
This very assumption had caused the Western powers to overestimate China; yet when tested against Japan's might, China's feeble strength stood mercilessly exposed. No sooner had they recognized this miscalculation than those mercurial Great Powers—swinging from one extreme to another—pronounced China's disintegration irreparable.
They became convinced that should Japan apply but the slightest additional pressure, collapse would follow instantaneously.
This indeed formed a crucial factor precipitating what became known as the Triple Intervention.

If China was already powerless, then the next issue to arise became the demarcation of spheres of influence. This issue had been vigorously debated at the time, but I zealously denounced it as mere fantasy. What were spheres of influence? This term had been used during the partition of Africa, but Africa was originally uninhabited land. Thus, while the Great Powers could each plot maps in hand and demarcate from here to there as whose sphere of influence, China existed under circumstances entirely distinct from this. It possessed four thousand years of history, boasted a corresponding four thousand years of civilization, encompassed a territory nearly as vast as all of Europe combined, and was home to four hundred million people dwelling within its borders. How could one ever partition this in the manner of Africa? However, the world that had initially overestimated China now, in reaction, underestimated it excessively. Indeed, this reached such a point that a map partitioning China appeared early on in the Jiji Shinpō, and even our diplomatic authorities submitted proposals for partition. However, I opposed such notions as fallacies and fantasies to the very end. The Great Powers who contemplated partitioning China would bring calamity upon themselves. If one sought to destroy China, they must first be resolved to slaughter its entire populace. But could they truly slaughter them all? If they could do it, let them try. What was to be done with the prolific Chinese nation? They could never be completely exterminated. To slaughter a million of the Chinese nation, they would have to sacrifice at least a hundred thousand of their own citizens. Would they endure even that and continue their assault? Before the Chinese people could be completely slaughtered, the European forces acting as attackers would first perish. As for what they perceived the outcome would be—that China would undoubtedly continue to exist—we vehemently opposed such views at the time.

II. The Great Powers Exploit China’s Apprehension

The second discourse on Eastern Peace was published following the Russo-Japanese War.
Struck by Japan’s formidable might, the Chinese people were gripped by profound terror.
Not only did the Chinese people fear that Japan might ultimately use this momentum to conquer all of China—
The Western powers seeking to expand their commercial rights in China did not welcome Japan’s influence extending into Chinese markets.
There, driven by jealousy, they attempted to slander Japan to the Chinese people, claiming that Japan was now striving with covetous intent to destroy China.
This was extremely dangerous.
"The Westerners harbor no such ambitions," they declared.
They argued that there was nothing better than keeping the Japanese at a distance and aligning with Western interests.
This exerted great power in amplifying Chinese anxieties.
However, this view was mistaken.
Both the West and China needed to awaken to this observational error.
Japan and China share proximate borders; their peoples are akin; their written characters too are kindred.
Therefore, we should rely on the Chinese people as allies—why would we ever plot something like destroying their country?
To consider destroying China—there could be nothing more disadvantageous for Japan.
If the Chinese people were to rashly succumb to others’ incitements and act hostile toward Japan, nothing would prove more detrimental to them—thus, I primarily argued from a Chinese-centric standpoint.
This constituted the essay’s consistent ideological core.

III. The Support of China Is a Mission Bestowed Upon Us by Heaven

At that time, following these developments, I was about to expound upon the third discourse on Eastern Peace; yet the vital relationship between Japan and China remained unchanged—as it had been ten years prior, so it was then and would be ten years hence. No—with the economic relations between Japan and China having grown increasingly intimate of late compared to former times, there were even greater interests at stake. China’s collapse would almost inevitably lead Japan to face fearsome national peril. Although Japan’s very existence might not have been imperiled by whatever might occur, there remained something truly fearsome. In Japan’s international trade at that time, no counterpart surpassed China in the magnitude of its volume. Due to China’s productive capacity being exceedingly low then, the majority of goods were being supplied from our nation. Considering their vast population and further taking into account their vigorous reproductive power, the Chinese people truly stood as a major customer of our nation at present and were poised to become an even greater customer in the future. Japan, as a debtor nation, suffered under debt then; but were this trade with China to continue flourishing hereafter, it would inevitably escape its fate as a debtor and even rise to become a creditor nation. However, should this—our major market—unfortunately collapse into disintegration, our trade would abruptly cease. In that case, there could be no greater disadvantage for our country than this. Yet when one considered it thoroughly, this was still nothing more than a minor disadvantage before our eyes. When contemplating the future of our national destiny stretching into eternity, there truly existed something that chilled the heart to its core. Following China’s collapse, an even more fearsome new Western power would emerge across the waters on that continental shore. When matters reached this point, our Japanese Empire would immediately face grave peril to its territorial integrity. Were Japan to retreat into an isolated island while preserving its current financial strength, could it truly maintain its infinitely proliferating population? Ultimately, it was impossible. Therefore, Japan had to resolutely maintain its voice in China to the very end.

Maintaining China’s security, developing its civilization, and thereby upholding Eastern peace—for Japan, this could not be avoided; indeed, we might declare it our mission to such an extent.
One could not abandon it even if attempting to cast it aside; others could not seize it even if striving to wrest it away.
For Japan and China shared not only a common race and script but also economic relations that stood unrivaled in the world.
Already drawing from the same wellspring of civilization—with thought, emotion, customs, and habits all rooted in one source—their bond proved as inseparable as lacquer and glue, while their combined populations—being of shared ethnicity—nearly equaled that of the white race.
Were such a great race to align its stride and advance unitedly, they might someday stand opposed to East and West alike—each proudly proclaiming their civilization.
Given Japan’s civilizational superiority over China—by virtue of its seniority in development—it fell upon Japan to naturally assume responsibility for guiding China toward ascending as the world’s supreme civilization.
This constituted Japan’s divine mandate.
Therefore, our China policy had perforce to be proactive—passivity could never be countenanced.

IV. The Republic Government Lacks Strength

Such matters were what I had often expounded upon whenever opportunity arose; yet observing its actual state revealed complexities defying simplicity.
Today saw a revolutionary government established—yet this existence remained purely nominal.
It possessed no substantive power.
Form concerned me not—be it monarchy, empire, or republic mattered little if China’s strength could withstand modern global competition.
Regrettably however, contemporary China’s governance proved woefully inadequate for its charge.
Financially at least, it stood demonstrably feebler than its Manchu predecessor—destined to collapse within days absent foreign loans propping its existence.
China’s administration demanded six hundred million yen annually yet scraped barely two hundred million through actual revenues—a mere third of necessity’s measure.
Thus arose inexorable need for four hundred million more through bold fiscal resolve—yet given national conditions no means existed to extract such sums domestically—leaving recourse solely in foreign debt’s bitter draught.

Moreover, since ancient times, the Chinese nation had been a people difficult to collect taxes from.
I do not say it was solely because of their inherently greedy nature.
Philosophers dared to condemn taxation; if taxes were collected, they immediately denounced it as tyrannical governance.
There was a basis for this.
When considering how tax revenues were allocated in China: if rulers used them to undertake public works, construct palaces, and indulge in luxury, the bureaucrats surrounding them likewise employed these funds to purchase land, pursue profit-making ventures, and make provisions for their descendants’ futures.
Therefore, taxes came to hold no meaning beyond serving the insatiable greed of those in power.
This was the entrenched ill that had persisted throughout China’s history from antiquity to the present.
Precisely for this reason, legislators and moralists had consistently treated taxation as a symbol of tyrannical governance, using it to admonish rulers above and caution bureaucrats below.
That was because when it came to taxes, the notion that they served one’s own private interests had long dominated their minds.
This was why throughout history, whenever a revolution occurred in China, they promptly declared exemptions from that year’s taxes—a stratagem this latest revolutionary movement had once again drawn from that old playbook.
The purpose of taxation must not inherently be as such.
Taxes must always align with the state’s interests.
That is to say, [taxes] should be used to safeguard the people’s security, uphold order, and advance their welfare; to fund undertakings that only the state’s power can accomplish and that a minority could never achieve; or to furnish equipment for defending against external enemies or punishing them—for without this, the nation cannot endure for even a day.

V. What Is to Be Done with a Powerless Government?

Civilized governance above all required vast sums of money.
That is to say, it demanded taxes.
Thus did the Chinese conception of taxation prove fundamentally irreconcilable with civilized governance.
Here lay the imperative to sweep away traditional Chinese ideology root and branch.
Simultaneously, the government needed to wield immense authority.
No nation in the world contained citizens who paid taxes willingly.
Since willingness proved absent, taxation necessarily carried coercive implications.
This constituted the very reason why central authority required absolute power.
The central government must perpetually maintain sufficient strength to preserve national peace and order intact.
Should citizens refuse tax payments—and should attempts at collection immediately disrupt public tranquility—the state stood obligated to suppress such resistance with overwhelming force.

Yet did the current Republican government command such potency?
When confronted with these circumstances, its officials merely fawned upon the populace, desperately courting popular favor through conciliatory measures.
This self-evidently demonstrated their lack of true authority.
Though uncertain of its efficacy, they nonetheless employed methods to win over public sentiment.

Thus taxes ultimately could not be collected.
Following the revolution, central coffers received barely twenty million taels.
How could any central government sustain itself without regional tax revenues?
Compelled by necessity, they turned to foreign loans.

This condition persisted not solely under Yuan Shikai’s administration—were Yuan to fall and Sun Yat-sen rise, or Huang Xing ascend, matters would remain unchanged regardless of leadership.

Unless revolutionary thought shattered China’s obstinate traditional fallacies, this present condition would remain unchanged though ten thousand generations might pass.
This was why China’s national destiny grew ever more diminished with each passing day.

VI. The Current Heyday of Foreign Loans

Foreign loans were now being utilized throughout all eighteen provinces of China. Initially, only the central government had engaged in foreign borrowing while strictly prohibiting local governments from doing so; yet when local governments came seeking administrative funds from the central authority, it inherently possessed nothing to give. They had no choice but to finally permit foreign loans to local governments as well—that is, they permitted economic loans while excluding political ones. This was why across the provinces today, parties had begun fiercely competing by offering large and small foreign loans secured against railways, mines, and various other interests. Amidst this, Western entrepreneurs—or capitalists, though whether they were all genuine capitalists or mere speculators remained unclear—operated in chaotic disarray, working without hindrance. Then suddenly fierce competition arose. Our country’s astute industrialists were likely participating in this fray as well, though due to their limited strength they would achieve nothing substantial. Diplomats and others probably lent their assistance too. There kickbacks arose once more—commissions that might well have originated in China on the world stage. In the West they called this a type of business practice, but in China from this very practice emerged extraordinarily disorderly and immense kickbacks. This was an inherent trait of the Chinese people: once they touched money, they inevitably pocketed a portion for themselves. This stood as the greatest evil custom in that land. Nurtured increasingly until it grew to massive scale, this corruption had now reached a state where no wise man could effectively prohibit it. Foreign loans flourished so vigorously across all China because even were the nation to collapse into fragments, its vast wealth would remain unchanged—destined to endure eternally alongside its mountains and rivers. China’s current state presented an appearance almost akin to some great magnate opening their treasure vault to distribute riches to the public. And the more this movement prospered, the more central and local bureaucrats—both high and low—gained their measure of profit. Consequently this created conditions that spurred ever greater prosperity.

Such a situation verges on falsehood—indeed, we too wish it were mere fiction—yet alas, it stands as unvarnished truth. Just as Japan now grapples with a scandal so foul it assaults decency itself, China has ever been thus: indifferent whether others perish or its own nation plummets into ruin.

VII. What Is Japan’s Position Regarding China?

How then would the future of China—then in the heyday of foreign loans—unfold? Wherever prospects of great economic gain emerged, Western capitalists swiftly swarmed in. Once a great profit was perceived in some place, an intense speculative fever suddenly arose—there had often been cases where this disrupted European markets. Such bitter experiences were more numerous among Westerners than Easterners; they had repeated them countless times since their ancestors' days. One might think such bitter experiences would not be repeated—but that was a grave error indeed! In fact they had repeated this many times over! Therefore China's current state followed suit—when China cried 'Lend!', they readily complied with 'Here—take it all!'—and kept lending endlessly! But what would become of pouring capital so excessively? A time would come when investors realized no profit came despite all investments! China's turmoil was yet ahead! When even interest payments became impossible—private relations ultimately transformed into state affairs! Thus creditor nations dispatched officials to oversee finances! A recent example had been seen in Egypt's foreign loans! Smaller loan relations with Egypt still existed elsewhere—but speaking of major ones—Britain and France stood paramount! Egypt—not even one-tenth China's size—bordered both British and French territories! These two nations ultimately clashed over Egypt's bankruptcy! After thirty years of rivalry—they finally reached agreement—restoring amicable relations! Yet China's foreign loans involved six nations—Britain—France—Germany—America—Russia—and Japan! Next ranked Belgium and Holland—America having withdrawn midway from the Six-Nation Consortium—yet remaining China's creditor all same! Therefore speaking of major players—the six initially counted indeed remained paramount!

Among these creditor nations, they were limited to the original four countries; Russia and Japan did not participate. In terms of loan amounts, Japan occupied the lowest position. However, when viewed through the lens of vested interests, Japan held the greatest stake. Geographically speaking, while all others lay at great distances, Japan stood as a neighboring country separated only by a narrow strip of water. By vessel count on Chinese rivers, Britain held first place with Japan immediately following in second. This described the current state; extrapolating from its steadily increasing share, I believed Japan would soon rise to claim first place. In both maritime navigation and trade relations alike, Japan's position grew ever more promising. When analyzing the six nations' dealings with China through this framework, the role Japan must assume for itself had to be one of considerable magnitude.

VIII. The Difficulty of Seizing China

In China, bandits known as the White Wolf Bandits had recently arisen in Henan.
Henan, known as the Central Plains of China, was where they arose and threatened to spread further.
When they grew rampant, railways were destroyed.
Transportation was thereby severed.
Consequently, commerce too was obstructed.
Moreover, with the central government's power remaining feeble and unable to control this situation, investor nations placed no trust in the Republican government and inevitably took it upon themselves to protect their investment interests.
This meant occupying Chinese territory, but even through occupation, collecting taxes from the same Chinese populace proved difficult.
If taxes were forcibly collected, rebellions erupted immediately.
Bandits rose up everywhere, exhausting the Great Powers who sought to suppress them.
This required vast sums of money yet yielded no returns.
No—not only yielded nothing, but rather caused ever-increasing losses.
Yet expecting capitalists to bear these costs for their own benefit was manifestly impossible.
However much a nation might spend to protect its interests, international treaties naturally restricted unilateral action.
Even given free rein, China proper contained four hundred million people.
Militarily controlling this proved so difficult that it became a truly vexing problem.
The Western powers too found this exceedingly troublesome.
This was precisely why I had now thrice expounded upon Eastern peace.

Although the West had likely studied China quite thoroughly, they frequently erred in their observations.
They underwent at least three transformations.
That is to say, they first feared it, then despised it and contemplated partition, but later realized their error and shifted course to attempt securing economic interests.
However, contrary to expectations, a fervor for reclaiming rights and interests arose in China, and when America undertook railway construction in Guangdong, China rejected this.
When Germany began mining operations in Shandong, China again launched a desperate campaign to reject this, and in each case reclaimed those concessions.
Thereupon the Great Powers realized the difficulty of acquiring concessions and this time began lending capital to Chinese enterprises.
When they desired to acquire something, that very thing was safely obtained.
This served to satisfy China's national pride on one hand while enabling us to secure ample benefits on the other.
Yet even more unexpectedly, the Revolution erupted, and if one was to lend money at all, they began offering up any and all collateral demanded.
That is to say—though calling it "capitalistic conquest" may be a misnomer—the Great Powers were vigorously pursuing capitalistic development in China.
They deemed this approach as the most promising for the future and one that would yield substantial profits.

IX. Who Would Harbor Territorial Ambitions?

Adopting an aggressive attitude toward China proved exceedingly difficult.
Therefore, while nations in the past might have harbored such ambitions toward China, I believe those entertaining such designs today had become exceedingly scarce.
There had been much talk in recent times regarding Russia’s policies toward Mongolia.
Yet Russia’s relationship with Mongolia did not develop overnight.
For two hundred years since Mongolia’s invasion of Russia and subsequent repulsion, the Cossacks conversely entered Mongolia.
Since Peter the Great’s era, Russians maintained constant contact with Mongols and Tatars in Outer Mongolia.
There existed a region called Huijiangbu—also known as Ili or Xinjiang—inhabited by Tatars who regularly crossed the Tianshan Mountains into Russia.
They had even once declared independence from China.
Geographically speaking, all these regions lay closer to Russia than to China proper.
In places like Outer Mongolia, steamships plied the rivers.
One could board the Siberian Railway from near Omsk.
Thus their natural gravitation toward Russia became an unavoidable course.
Mongolia was a vast grassland inhabited by nomadic peoples.
In eras when they freely migrated seeking water and pasture, they moved southward and repeatedly clashed with China.
Though they ultimately submitted, who could have known? Behind their negotiations with Russia lay something no less significant than their dealings with China.
Russia’s Mongolian policies stemmed from this history rather than constituting fresh aggression.
Moreover, invasion promised little substantial gain.
Historically speaking, however, Mongolia had clearly lain within Russia’s sphere of influence for fifty years.
No—tracing back further, this dated from Peter the Great’s time, with Chinese territoriality ultimately affirmed through the Aigun Treaty.

During that period, they had already entered Russian territory multiple times.
That is to say, present-day Ramoryō stands as one such instance.
Perhaps during that era, they strangely maintained a dual affiliation with both China and Russia—this might have resembled our Ryukyu of old.
At times they appeared to take up arms against China, yet ultimately failed to become a fully independent nation.
Nevertheless, they simultaneously resisted full integration into China’s governance.
This was precisely why I delivered my final warning to China a year ago, urging them to consolidate suzerainty over their dependencies and grant them independence.
Yet President Yuan refused to heed my counsel at that time.
This very obstinacy has precipitated today’s crisis.

Turning now to Tibet’s situation, the same principle applied.
Were Tibet to fall under another power’s influence, India would immediately face strategic threats due to their geographical proximity.
Beyond the mountain slopes lay Darjeeling—a city where summers stayed refreshingly cool, serving as a summer retreat for India’s high officials.
Tibet held such critical importance for India’s defense that Britain could never tolerate its transfer to rival powers.
Yet bringing Tibet fully under India’s administrative control remained profoundly challenging.
Britain’s sole aim regarding Tibet was to prevent its alignment with other forces; she harbored no designs for plunder.
If Britain already adhered to this stance, what reason could other nations have to meddle in Tibet?
France’s position in Southern Qing followed similar logic.
France found itself burdened even by its sole possession of Tonkin.
Tonkin offered no profitable prospects for foreign powers.
Having learned this lesson, why would France trouble itself with territorial schemes in China?
As for Germany—how viable was maintaining isolated territories in distant China?
Such considerations surely gave pause to German statesmen.
Surveying the Great Powers’ postures, none appeared reckless enough to pursue territorial ambitions against China at present.
Yet ambitions to dominate China through commercial means were precisely what these powers would gradually cultivate.

X. Guide British Public Opinion

China’s future was destined to face no small turmoil due to the economic ambitions of these Great Powers.
That is to say, fierce competition would arise among them.
As a result, intense conflicts of interest would emerge.
This would ultimately lead to disturbances threatening Eastern peace.
Consequently, China was fated to plunge into dire straits.
In such circumstances, Japan could not afford passivity.
It fell upon Japan to resolutely prop China upright through active measures.
This prerogative remained beyond any external sway.
We had no choice but to prepare extensively for China’s impending crisis looming on history’s horizon.
Where—save for our Great Japanese Empire—could one find the mission to rescue that ancient continental power across the waters, bearer of four millennia’s civilization and chronicles, from its wretched fate?
Such a mission transcended mere martial prowess.
Nor could it be reduced to financial calculations alone.
This demanded resolution by a people sharing racial lineage and written tradition—a nation united in thought, sentiment, customs, and cultural foundations.
As previously expounded, our borders stood adjacent.
Even when contemplating forceful intervention, Japan occupied the most strategically vital position.
When crisis struck—where but through Japan could swift preservation of public order and security be achieved?
Yet stationing imperial troops directly along China’s frontiers risked dangerous misinterpretations.
Misapprehensions bred envious suspicions that would inevitably shatter regional stability.
Hence preventing such misunderstandings among the Powers became imperative.
I maintained faith that Anglo-Japanese alliance could safeguard China’s security while forestalling its imminent disintegration.

However, above all, Japan must take on the leading role in this movement and bear the greatest share of responsibility.
And it must fully prevent the emergence of suspicion toward this.
Therefore, setting aside the other Great Powers for the time being, the sincerity of our Japan must be most thoroughly understood by the people of Britain, its ally.
However, I do not speak today of this lack of understanding to blame the British.
It is simply that we must proactively and consistently apply effort from our side to obtain that understanding.
That is to say, we must ceaselessly guide the public opinion of our ally and fully make known where our sincerity lies, as well as the nature of our mission.
Once we successfully guide their public opinion to a state of no regret, what concerns could there possibly be in our China policy?
This is where we must consistently focus our efforts.

XI. This revolution has been botched.

China’s current state was already beyond remedy; no wise man or expert could save it.
Since ancient times, China had been a country unified through military force.
Yet what of this revolution?
By what had the 250-year-old Manchu court been overthrown? Not through military force.
It was solely through clever stratagems.
That is to say, when the Manchu government failed, the revolutionary party also failed, and Yuan—who stood between them—succeeded in becoming sovereign and president.
Such masterful success had no precedent in history; from this perspective alone, one must acknowledge President Yuan’s formidable political skill.
As a foreigner, I would not presume to judge the rights and wrongs of this.
If only China could sweep away its longstanding delusions, levy sufficient taxes to fund national expenditures, organize a modern state, and thereby secure its own stability—that would suffice.
Yet President Yuan lacked precisely this capability.
Though President Yuan had secured the country through stratagems, he could not collect taxes through stratagems.
Collecting taxes required formidable central authority—authority which the Yuan government conspicuously lacked.
This was precisely why China’s national power remained so feeble.

First, looking at China today, there were no tax officials.
There were no officials capable of collecting taxes.
As evidence of this, when tax collection had been left to Chinese officials, salt taxes could not be sufficiently collected; but this time, with approval from five nations, officials dispatched from Britain were made to supervise the tax collection—these being remarkably capable individuals—resulting in unexpectedly high revenue.
Second, regarding what served as collateral for the foreign loans, it was due to this increase in salt tax revenue.
Initially, two hundred fifty million had been thought sufficient as collateral for the loans; however, upon observing this revenue increase, it became clear that five hundred million could indeed serve as collateral.
It was likely that another two hundred fifty million would be lent.
The Great Powers would gladly lend any amount of money as long as there was collateral.
If this was already possible with the salt tax, then collecting six or seven hundred million in taxes from China would have been an easy task.
What Sir Robert Hart, Inspector-General of Customs, had once advised the Chinese government was that it lay in collecting six or seven hundred million in taxes by consolidating overlapping levies as land tax.
However, given that this concerned such a vast nation if thoroughly investigated, collecting around ten hundred million would not have been impossible.
As long as a tax system was established and there were capable officials, that would have sufficed.
Even if there had been capable officials, if they were lining their own pockets in the process, it was no good.
However, since this was an age-old bad custom of the Chinese people, there were aspects that could not be reformed overnight.
Therefore, until good customs were established, they should temporarily give sufficient rewards to officials to satisfy them, while simultaneously establishing a disciplined military and police force and possessing the power to completely suppress both horse bandits and White Wolf Bandits.
If sufficient power to safeguard the peace and order of the people had been established, restraining other corrupt officials would have been a trivial matter. Such a task should originally have been easily achievable through revolutionary force, but alas, China’s revolution had been botched.
At this juncture, there was no choice but to rely on foreign power.

XII. Japan-China Unity Is an Inherent Covenant

I wondered if any still clung to dreams of Europe's sixteenth- and seventeenth-century exploits, but such fantasies demanded immediate discarding.
In our conviction, we maintained that non-white peoples could stand fully equal to their Caucasian counterparts.
Thus resolved we to extend fraternal salvation to our racial kin—the Chinese nation—without limit, seeking through harmonization of East-West civilizations to birth a glorious new cultural synthesis.
This constituted nothing less than our purpose as Japan's people.
By necessity China must persist as our eternal partner in this endeavor.
Here lay manifest that interdependence likened to lips and teeth.
No mere abstraction this.
For verily when lips perish, teeth face winter's bite.
We staked our nation's security upon China serving as bulwark—its dismantling presaging imminent peril to imperial destiny.
Yet now this China teetered at history's crossroads: would its people become relics of ruin or phoenixes reborn?
Not one day could be spared to rescue her from eggshell fragility.
We who stood advanced upon civilization's path felt duty-bound to hasten implementation.
This very imperative compelled my thrice-repeated discourse on Eastern Peace.